Joseph E. FALLON
Since 2013, when China launched its Belt Road Initiative, Beijing has been seeking to achieve economic dominance over Eurasia from which political and military ascendancy would follow. It is “Soviet redux” with Chinese characteristics and follows a strategy first proposed more than one hundred years ago.
In 1904, in his article for the Royal Geographical Society, “The Geographical Pivot of History” British political geographer, Sir Halford John Mackinder examined the rise and fall of empires on the Eurasian continent. (Illustration 1).
In this paper he first offered the theory of the “Pivot Area,” a designation for the core area of Eurasia, which was protected from the maritime powers of the day. He reasoned that the development of the potential power of this area could enable the continental power that controlled it to dominate the world.” (Map 1)
In 1919, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder summarized his theory in three famous lines:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the world.
For a brief period, 1949-1960, prior to the Sino-Soviet split, the Communist world came close to establishing hegemony over Mackinder’s “World Island”. (Map 2)
After the ideological schism between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, Beijing turned inward and engaged in acts of self-destruction, the “Great Leap Forward”, 1958-1962, and the “Cultural Revolution”, 1966-1976. While Moscow pursued a strategy of maintaining control of Eastern Europe and the “Heartland” from which to dominate the surrounding territory in Mackinder called the “Inner Crescent” of the “World Island”. (Map 3)
Communist World Stretching from Central Europe to the South China Sea, 1949-1960
Map 3 Soviet control heartland to control Inner Crescent or Rimland, of the World Island.
Moscow first secured the borders of the “Heartland”, the Soviet Union, from hostile neighbors to the west, south, and east by applying to its foreign policy the concept of “strategic depth”. Defined as expanding “distances between the front lines or battle sectors and the combatants’ industrial core areas, capital cities, heartlands, and other key centers of population or military production”, control of Eastern Europe provided the Soviet Union with strategic depth. And validated Mackinder’s belief in the impor-tance of Eastern Europe in securing hegemony over the “World Island”. (Map 4).
Map 4 Map of the Soviet strategic defense lines, 1945-2014
Once this first objective was realized, the Soviet Union could purse its second ideological objective of exporting Marxism-Leninism, inseparable from Soviet strategic interest, globally with attention to Western Europe, Iran, India, Vietnam, and Korea. Mackinder’s “Inner Crescent”.
This was done primarily by the Soviet Union’s military strength in establishing the Warsaw Pact and projecting power in East Germany, 1953, Hungary, 1956, and Czechoslovakia, 1968, and by Moscow’s control of local Communist parties along Mackinder’s “Inner Crescent” through the Comintern. 1919-1943, and its successor, the Cominform, 1947-1956.
While Mackinder’s theory influenced the foreign policy of the former Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991, that policy did not insure the survival of the USSR. (Map 5 and 6)
Map 5 The Warsaw Pact, 1980
Map 6 Russia after the collapse of the Soviet empire, 1991
Following the December 1991 implosion of the USSR, a power vacuum was created in former Soviet Central Asia. And politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum; setting the stage for rival powers to vie for influence in the region – Iran and Turkey, Pakistan and India, Russia, the U.S., and China. By 2020, only the U.S. and China possessed the economic power to contest dominance over this strategic area, which Mackinder’s called the ”geographical pivot of Asia”. (Map 7)
Map 7 Halford Mackinder’s Pivot in 1904 and 1919
Map 8 Oil pipelines as of 2011
Map 9 Natural gas pipelines as of 2011
It is the “heart” of the “Heartland. Whatever state dominates the former Soviet republics of Central Asia wins “a potential economic prize: an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves” whose growing number of pipelines feed the energy dependency of Asia and Europe.
The “Great Game” the Nineteenth Century rivalry between London and Moscow for control of Central Asia, was reborn with China and the U.S. contending for sway over former Soviet Central Asia. A rivalry defined by petropolitics, pipeline diplomacy, and energy geopolitics. “[T]o use a similar phrase to the one of Mackinder’s, who controls the export routes, controls the energy resources, who controls the energy resources, controls the Eurasian Heartland.” (Map 8 and Map 9)
Recognizing the petroleum factor in the geostrategic importance of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski,, American professor, diplomat, and presidential adviser, advocated Mackinder’s theory as the basis for the politics of the post-Cold War world. Renaming the “Great Game”, “the Grand Chessboard”, he wrote: “A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would almost automatically entail Africa‘s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent.” (Map 10)
Map 10 Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Eurasia is Mackinder’s World Island
In 1942, Nicholas John Spykman, professor at Yale University, turned Mackinder’s theory on its head; asserting the “Rimland”, Mackinder’s “Inner Crescent”, not Mackinder’s “Heartland”, is key to dominating the “World Island”. (Map 11)
“Spykman differed in his interpretation of geopolitics from Mackinder but built on Mackinder’s overall concept and vocabulary to define his view.”
Despite the fate of the Soviet Union and the fact geopolitics often leads to “imperial overstretch” – defined “as the overextension either geographically, economically, or militarily that inevitably leads to the exhaustion of vital domestic resources, decline, and fall” – Spykman’s “Rimland” theory is shaping Beijing’s foreign policy.
As China’s 2015 white paper on military strategy stated: “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”
Beijing is spending $1.3 trillion to pursue its Belt Road Initiative to link the economies of Europe, Africa, and Asia to China by sea as well as land. This makes Beijing the world’s largest lender exceeding “traditional, official lenders such as the World Bank, the IMF, or all OECD creditor governments combined.””
In the process, China seeks nothing less than hegemony over the “World Island”. (Map 12, countries, Map 13, land and sea corridors)
A quest for hegemony is officially denied by Beijing but is acknowledged in domestic discourse. “[R]esearch from unofficial PRC state- and CCP-affiliated publications shows that Chinese analysts believe developing the BRI and achieving Chinese security are intimately linked. In fact, Chinese analysts-in both diplomatic and military publications-explicitly discuss using international assistance and the BRI as a pretext for pursuing China’s grand strategy. Many of these observers recognize that a network of maritime logistics hubs throughout the Indo-Pacific, including ports, has the potential to change the region’s strategic landscape, and several explicitly describe the role of infrastructure investment in Chinese grand strategy. Scholars from the PLAN’s Naval Research Institute do not speak on behalf of the state, but they do reflect the overarching ambitions found in China’s domestic discourse on this issue: ‘meticulously select locations, deploy discreetly, prioritize cooperation, and slowly infiltrate.’” [Underline added]
“[T]hrough the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s China has invested heavily and become enmeshed within the politics of countries across the globe.”
Map 13 Land and sea routes of China’s Belt Road Initiative
By such means, Beijing seeks to reshape the global economic and political order to its advantage. It has already successfully changed the narrative on human rights. “The international community’s unwillingness and inability to hold China to account is driven by China’s growing economic dominance, especially as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gains momentum, Beijing’s willingness to tolerate human rights abuses in other countries, and its moderately successful efforts to modify the interna-tional human rights regime to make it more accommodating of China’s actions.”
It is Soviet redux. Beijing employs different means, principally soft power, loans, credits, and diplomatic intimidation, instead of hard power, overt political coercion and military intervention, for the same objective -command of the “World Island”, rendering Oceania and the Western Hemisphere peripheral dependencies.
Contrast Soviet tanks rolling into Prague, Czechoslovakia in 1968, later rumbling into Kabul, Afghanistan in 1979 to China’s financial acquisition of Greece’s strategic port of Piraeus in 2008. By 2018, Beijing had acquired “at least 10 percent of all equity in ports in Europe with deals inked in Greece, Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium”. As China’s famous military strategist , Sun Tzu, wrote: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
The scope of geopolitical objectives pursued by Beijing is extensive in how much of the “World Island” they cover and in the various means being employed to do so.
As Asia Society reported in 2020, “China is constructing maritime, continental, digital, space, health and various other belts and roads. It is developing Smart Cities and 5G networks, increasing trade and investment ties, expanding its commercial presence, activating patriotic appeals to Chinese diaspora communities, undertaking new military diplomacy, boosting traditional civilian diplomacy, expanding its media reach, and erecting new infrastructure projects under the BRI banner. Across multiple domains, Beijing is amassing levers of influence to be able to operate in a more favorable strategic environment. Combined with China’s systematic push to expand its influence in multilateral rule-setting institutions and in some cases to create new ones, these roads seem to lead toward a regional or perhaps global ecosystem that would disadvantage the United States and other of China’s competitors.”
Beijing “is developing a network of ‘strategic strongpoints’ that can significantly raise the costs of any U.S. military intervention and lower the willingness of BRI host governments to offer access or assistance to the U.S.” 
To those ends, the Belt Road initiative’s land and maritime corridors enables China to implement a series of “transportation, energy, and trade projects” across the Eurasian continent. (Map 14)
The immediate focus has been on roads and railroads calculated by the World Bank as 31,000 kilometers of railroads and 12,000 kilometers of roads in the six land corridors through Asia and Europe, (Map 15) and oil and gas pipelines from Burma, Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia to China. (Map 16)
Geopolitics, not economics, is driving these projects. As Wang Yiwei, Renmin University, Beijing, explained “a fundamental misreading of the plan abroad is an assumption that it’s supposed to be profitable. Some are strategic projects like CPEC [China-Pakistan Economic Corridor], they aren’t about making money and the fact is that it’s hard for infrastructure to make money.’”
In his analysis of China’s 2015 white paper, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, John Lee, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and senior fellow (non-resident) at the United States Studies Centre and adjunct professor at the University of Sydney, notes how China set three objectives for the Belt Road Initiative. They are:
- “to export excess industrial capacity, described by Beijing ‘as the sword of Damocles hanging over its head’ … to overseas markets.”
- “to spur development in its impoverished western regions [i.e., to promote Chinese colonization of Tibet and Xinxiang] by connecting these regions to economies and markets to the west”; and
- “to form physical, digital, and financial networks with new and existing markets in Central Asia and Europe” [i.e., to replace Western existing trading standards with those favored by Beijing].”
The third point is, arguably, the more important. The geopolitics of China’s Belt Road Initiative is steeped in the concept of Tianxia.
“Literally ‘all under heaven’, it referred in traditional times to the sway of the Chinese emperor…. Lacking formal boundaries, tianxia may take in the known world. In current foreign policy debates, it means a projected global order that, unlike the system of nation-states, conforms to Chinese values, and in nationalist interpretations is amenable to Chinese interests.”
Tianxia appears in the operation of China’s Belt Road Initiative. In “Power Play: Addressing China’s Belt and Road Strategy”, CNAS, September 20, 2018, Daniel Kliman and Abigail Grace documented how the Initiative “…advances a ‘China First’ development model that maximizes its economic interests while offering minimal capacity building to countries receiving investment.” 
This was corroborated by the findings of the CSIS Reconnecting Asia database, which reported 89 percent of China’s transportation projects have gone to Chinese companies. Whereas projects by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have a participation rate of “29 percent are Chinese, 40.8 percent are local, and 30.2 percent are foreign.” 
Furthermore, the Belt Road Initiative creates a “debt trap” for recipients. Twenty-three countries are now “significantly or highly vulnerable to debt distress.”
This “debt trap” creates what “50 scholars from over a dozen prominent Chinese government and university research institutes” call “strategic support states… insuring China has the ability and resources to guide the actions of the country so that they fit into [China’s] strategic needs. ”
Djibouti is one example. Located on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal, it is a strategic “choke point” for the shipping of oil to Europe, the U.S., and Asia. Djibouti has incurred a debt to China comparable to 70 percent of its GDP. Negotiations over this indebtedness enabled China to establish its first overseas outpost there in 2017, a naval base, the PLAN’s Djibouti Logistics Support Facility. 
While the former Soviet Union sought to dominate the “World Island” with its army, China seeks to do so with its navy. A navy where the distinction between civilian and military is increasingly blurred.
“Considered a “magic weapon”…and guiding principle of China’s active defense … strategy, the People’s War … doctrine proposes mobilizing civilians to defend the country. Today, its influence is most readily seen in the South China Sea, where ostensibly civilian Chinese fishing vessels actively enforce China’s territorial claims.
However, the concept of waging a “people’s war at sea” could go beyond fisher-men and trawlers. It suggests that China’s entire merchant marine – a country’s fleet of commercial vessels – can be used as an extension of military power. Indeed, a 2015 Chinese law dictates that all container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier, and break-bulk vessels be built to military standards. China passed another law in 2016 creating a legal framework for the use of civilian assets to support military logistics operations and requiring all Chinese industries that conduct international transportation to provide supplies and aid to Chinese military vessels as needed.”
In the words of a Chinese naval officer, “Wherever there is Chinese business, warships will have a transportation support point.”
And Chinese businesses are, themselves, espionage agents of the Chinese Communist Party. As mandated by Article 7 of the 2017 National Intelligence Law, “any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the law.” In return, the growth of these businesses is advanced by the projects of Beijing’s Belt Road Initiative.
First, the Belt Road Initiative created “a string of pearls”, military / commercial bases, strategically placed in the Indian and Pacific Oceans that provide Chinese companies security for their business. (Map 17 and Map 18).
Map 17 China’s oversea military/commercial bases known as the “String of Pearls.”
Map 18 Chinese Port Projects in Relation to Indo-Pacific
Map 19 Expansion of China’s investment in foreign ports
The official objectives are “exploitation of maritime resources (fishing and energy), development of the marine economy (shipping and shipbuilding), protection of the marine environment, and defense of China’s rights and interests with regard to territorial claims and access to key SLOCs [Sea lines of communications]”
Second, the Belt Road Initiative enables Chinese state-owned enterprises, COSCO and China Merchants Group (CMG), to invest in, or acquire, foreign ports principally in Europe and Asia, (Map 19).
Some of these ports can provide Beijing with military intelligence. “Eyal Pinko, a maritime cybersecurity and intelligence expert at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, believes China’s activities in Djibouti, Greece, Italy and other allied or friendly nations could pose a security risk to the US Navy. Pinko told Asia Times that Chinese port operators could closely monitor the movement of US and NATO warships gather information about their maintenance operations and have access to sensitive systems and equipment through interception of electromagnetic signals, intelligence-gathering by use of electronic sensors, visual and human intelligence.”
Third, the Belt Road Initiative enables Chinese businesses to invest in or purchase transportation and energy facilities in Europe. (Map 20)
“Whether it’s buying up London commercial real estate, German technology companies such as industrial robot maker Kuka AG, Scandinavian carmakers like Volvo Personvagnar AB, or such energy producers as Switzerland’s Addax Petroleum Corp., Chinese investments have clustered in a few key industries.” (Illustration 2)
Fourth, the Belt Road Initiative provides Chinese businesses additional oppor-tunities by Beijing’s policy to split the European Union and replace its quality and trading standards with those which conform to Chinese values. This has been attempted through the creation of the 16+1 group consisting of China and 16 central and east European states. Beijing treats this group of countries as a separate bloc from the European Union (Map 21).
“Beijing first began to realize (from around 2010 onwards) that an EU ‘strategic partnership’ did not automatically mean that Brussels would lift the arms embargo it imposed on China following the ordering of the PLA into the crowds on Tiananmen Square in 1989. In addition, when the EU chose not to acknowledge China’s Market Economy Status (MES), Beijing’s policymakers decided to counteract EU policies by dealing with individual EU member states in need of foreign investments and infrastructure development investments.
Map 21 Splitting the EU
Indeed, over recent years, China has been successfully taking advantage of EU disunity and the willingness of some member states to define and ‘adjust’ their policies towards China according to the amount of Chinese investments they could receive. For example…in June 2017, Greece blocked the unanimous adoption of a joint EU statement on human rights in China, while in March of the same year, Hungary prevented the EU from adding its name to a joint letter expressing concern about a report of lawyers in China being illegally detained and tortured. By coincidence, both Hungary and Greece have been recipients of large-scale Chinese investments over recent years.” 
Fifth, through loans to countries along the land and maritime routes of the Belt Road Initiative Chinese companies “win” job contracts while the recipient countries are ensnared in a “debt trap”, which endangers their economies making their governments amenable to Chinese interests. (Map 22).
By investments, purchases, and loans, China’s grand startegy employs what Dr. Edward Lutwack terms “geo-economics”,- “investment capital for industry provided or guided by the state is the equivalent of firepower; product development subsidized by the state is the equivalent of weapon innovation; and, market penetration supported by the state, replaces military bases and garrisons on foreign soil as well as diplomatic influence”.
Map 22 China’s loans to countries along the Belt Road Initiative
Map 23 Qing Empire and People’s Republic of China Boundaries
Through geo-economics and the “debt trap”, Beijing is addressing some of its disputed borders in Central Asia and with Russia, (Map 23).
These disputed areas, not just the South China Sea, may possess large quantities of petroleum for an energy hungry China.
Although Russian-Chinese relations are good and the outstanding difference of the Sino-Russian border were resolved in a series of treaties: the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement, and the 1994, 1997, 1998, and 2004 demarcation agreements between China and Russia, Beijing appears to have second thoughts on the agreed boundary line. China is calling Russia’s Pacific Maritime provinces, “Outer Manchuria”, and the Russian port of Vladivostok, “Haishenwai”. (Map 24)
Map 24 China’s claim to Russian territory
Through the Belt Road Initiative’s soft power, Chinese capital, Chinese com-panies, and Chinese workers, Beijing seeks to establish an economic and demograhic prescence in the region to bolster its claims to Russian lands if, and when, relations with Moscow deteriorate. (Map 25)
These demographics are themselves reinforced by the overall population disparity. At the Russia-Manchurian borderlands, 6 million Russians face 38 million Chinese.The same situation is happening to the boundary demarcations China negotiated with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Between 2002-2011, treaties delineating the borders between China and each of the three Central Asian republics during the 1990s were finally ratified.
In exchange for official Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik acquiesce to China’s suppression of Uighurs, and local Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, in Xinxiang, Beijing took only a small portion of the lands it claimed, “respectively 3.5, 22 and 32 percent of what was initially asked from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.”
But in 2020, two privately-owned Chinese websites that need official govern-ment approval to operate and are both headquarter in Beijing, posted articles which have raised concerns in Central Asia and Russia about Chinese territorial expansionism.
As Reuters reported on April 13, 2020, the Chinese website sohu.com posted an article “Why Kazakhstan is eager to return to China”. “The article retells in brief the history of Kazakhstan, noting that leaders of many Kazakh tribes had pledged allegiance to the Chinese emperor. It also states that Kazakhstan had historically been part of China’s territory and Kazakhs ‘do not have too many complaints’ about being repeatedly invaded by China.”
The next month, May 11, 2020, WION-India, reported the Chinese website, Tuotiao.com with 750 million readers posted “Why didn’t Kyrgyzstan return to China after gaining Independence?” The article asserted Kyrgyzstan, like Mongolia, had been a part of China. “It elaborated that under the Khan dynasty, 510,000 square kilometer of Kyrgyzstan, which means the entire country was part of Chinese lands, but the Russian empire took over the territory.”
Then in July 2020, an article by Chinese historian, Cho Yao Lu, widely disse-minated in official Chinese media outlets, stated “the entire Pamir region belonged to China at one time and consequently, he implies, Tajikistan should now or in the future return it to Beijing.”  The Pamir constitute 45 percent of the territory of Tajikistan.
“…his comments about Chinese historical control of the entire Pamir region suggest that he and others in China see the 2010 agreement as only a first step to a broader rectification in the PRC’s favor. And so, the argument goes, Chinese deve-lopment of its reacquired territory and of adjoining parts of Tajikistan’s Pamir lands are part of a single plan… Russian and Tajikistani analysts and officials believe Cho is speaking for far more than himself. Not only did he visit the Pamirs in 2018 as part of China’s plans to develop trade routes through that territory but his field notes at the time were published on the official website of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt, One Road’ project.”
In addition to Beijing’s vast array of economic, military, and demographic re-sources to advance its territorial claims, the position of Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Tajikistan are further weakened by the financial indebtedness that each has incurred to China as a result of the Belt Road Initiative’s “debt trap”.
According to a 2020 CSIS publication, “It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China-IMF Cooperation Across the Belt and Road,”“…eight BRI recipient countries – Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan – are at a high risk of debt distress due to BRI loans. These countries will all face rising debt-to-GDP ratios beyond 50 percent, with at least 40 percent of external debt owed to China once BRI lending is complete.”  [underline added] (Map 26)
The wealth China has acquired over the decades as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978 has enabled Beijing to modernize and enlarge its navy to pursue territorial claims at sea as well.
Using the nine-dash line, China is asserting its claim to the strategically located, and resource rich, Spratly, Paracel and Pratas Islands in the South China Sea. Beijing also claims the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Pratas and Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands are southeast and northwest of Taiwan, respectively. China would then surround Taiwan on three sides, four if air superiority in included. (Map 27)
Beijing has repeatedly stated “The Taiwan issue concerns China’s core interests [and] proper handling of this issue is key to ensuring the stable development of U.S.-China relations.”
With its Belt Road Initiative and expansion of naval presence, Beijing is following Spykman’s “Rimland” theory to control the “World Island”, Eurasia, and reshape the world’s economic and military balance to its advantage.
Map 27 China’s territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas.
The success of this strategy, however, requires the American presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans be neutralized. In the Western Pacific, Beijing is breaking the “island chains” Washington created during the Cold War to contain China’s maritime ambitions.
Map 28 China’s navy breaking the first island chain.
Map 29 Pentagon War Games in 2020: China “wins”
In October 2013, Beijing boasted it had successfully “dismembered” the “first island chain” that stretches from Japan southeast to Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia, encircling the South China Sea. China now seeks to “dismembered” the “second island chain”, stretching from Japan southwest to the Mariana Islands and Guam.
Beijing is endeavoring to utilize the “island chains” strategy to push the U.S. naval presence back to Guam (Map 28).
By such maneuverings, China seeks to position itself to be able to defeat the U.S. in any war in the Pacific. Ominously for Washington, war games conducted in 2020 by the Pentagon gave the “win” to China. (Map 29)
The vulnerability of Washington’s key geo-strategic asset in the Western Pacific, the “US island territory Guam, home to three US military bases, is a particular concern, the games revealed.”
To counter such a threat, Beijing’s military deployment in the Indian and Pacific oceans has to be checkmated by the U.S. and its allies.
As Kevin Rudd, President of the Asia Society Policy Institute noted in 2019, “[B]y abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead’… Xi Jinping has made a significant tactical error by attracting international opposition much earlier than was necessary.” 
An April 2020 internal report by China’s Ministry of State Security acknowledged “…global anti-China sentiment is at its highest since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown…”
Like the Soviet Union, China’s massive military buildup hides serious internal weaknesses in the structure of the state. While its economy is stronger than that of the former USSR, China suffers from significant economic weaknesses, in particular in its banking and real estate sectors
China’s economy is China’s “Achilles’ heel”. To checkmate Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions, exacerbate the fault lines within China’s economy.
This can be achieved by:
- eliminating the offensive capabilities of the Chinese navy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
- disrupting China’s oil and gas pipelines from Pakistan and Myanmar.
- disrupting China’s manufacturing sector.
Taken together, it is the application of Spykman’s “Rimland Theory” to China.
This would necessitate elevating the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), an informal strategic discussion group of the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India, into an alliance capable of military coordination. Then expand it to include Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan so China is effectively restrained to its south and east. Replacing the Pacific “island chains” with a QUAD “Rimland”. (Map 30)
Map 30 Evolving alliances in Asia
Blue: The Quad plus Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea. Red pro-China, Green: neutral
- Neutralize the offensive capabilities of the Chinese navy in the Indo-Pacific Theatre
In light of the results of the 2020 war games, the immediate need for the U.S. is to expand bilateral military relations, including intelligence sharing, with India, the only Asian country possessing the demographic, economic, geographic, and military resources to challenge Beijing.
Map 31 Chinese Military Presence in Indo-Pacific Region
Map 32 China’s “Malacca Dilemma”
China’s naval presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is to protect its economy by securing the shipping lanes for its oil imports until dependency on maritime routes can be significantly reduced by oil and gas pipelines. (Map 31)
The importance of “chokepoints” to these shipping lanes makes China’s economy and geopolitical ambitions vulnerable to sea interdiction. And Beijing is aware of this. “Sea lines and channels have already become [China’s] economic and societal develop-ment ‘lifelines’ [which are neither] possessed by us, nor controlled by us; in case a maritime crisis or war were to happen, our maritime routes have the possibility of being cut off.”
And the most important “chokepoint” is the Strait of Malacca. “Most of China’s imports derive from the Middle East and Angola. Currently, eighty percent of China’s oil has to pass through the Strait of Malacca, a narrow stretch of water between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. With Singapore, a major US ally that frequently participates in US naval drills, located at the mouth of the strait’s eastern opening, the Strait of Malacca becomes a natural strategic chokepoint. In the event of a conflict, the Malacca Strait could easily be blocked by a rival nation, cutting off China from crucial energy resources.” [Map 32]
“The closest alternative is the Sunda Strait whose narrowness and shallowness make it unsuitable as a passageway for large, modern ships. Other alternatives such as the Lombok and Makassar Straits are much longer routes that would incur additional shipping costs estimated to be from around $84 to $220 billion per year.”” [Map 33]
If war broke out with China, the US and Indian navies are in position to checkmate Beijing’s bases along the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean. Washington and New Delhi are capable of adapting General Douglas MacArthur’s “Operation Cartwheel” for the Pacific in World War II, the tactic of “leapfrogging” enemy bases, to the current situation in the Indian Ocean. Beijing’s supply lines to its bases are cut. “The string of pearls” is broken. China’s oil imports are interdicted at the Strait of Malacca undermining China’s economic and military power. (Map 34)
Anticipating such a possibility, Beijing has sought to use the Belt Road Initiative to eliminate New Delhi as a wartime threat by encircling India. On land roads and pipelines stretch around India to connect China to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. On the sea, Chinese naval bases extending from Pakistan to Sri Lanka to Bangladesh and Myanmar enclose India. (Map 35)
Map 35 China’s encirclement of India
Map 36 Sino-India Border Dispute
To complete the encirclement, in the north Beijing is constructing infrastructure projects along the 2,100 miles of disputed territory with New Delhi. (Map 36 and Map 37)
India has not only been encircled, it has been placed in a vise, facing a possible two-front war. With Indian military forces concentrated on repelling a Chinese attack along their disputed border, Pakistan could attack India’s position in Kashmir. Similarly, if Pakistan first attacks India in Kashmir, China could intervene to prevent Pakistan’s defeat by opening a second front hundreds of miles to the east, in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, land Beijing claims. A two-front war stretches India’s supply lines, prevents concentration of Indian forces, ensuring India is defeated, militarily and/or politically, in one or both theaters. A two-front war could inflict on India what India inflicted on Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which resulted in Pakistan losing territory with East Pakistan becoming the independent state of Bangladesh.
2a. Disrupt China’s energy supply lines from Pakistan.
However, New Delhi, with American support, can upend China’s strategy by directly disrupting China’s economic and military assets in countries surrounding India through indirect means. All while maintaining “plausible deniability”.
Taking liberty with Mackinder’s famous phrase:
To destabilize a “strategic support state” of China is to disrupt China’s economic assets in that country.
To disrupt China’s economic assets in a “strategic support state” is to destabilize China’s economy.
To destabilize China’s economy is to disrupt Beijing’s ability to projects its military power.
The task of India and the U.S. is to do what the U.S. did to the Soviets in Afgha-nistan force Beijing into “imperial overstretch”, “the overextension either geographically, economically, or militarily that inevitably leads to the exhaustion of vital domestic resources, decline, and fall” and intervene to protect China’s oil and gas pipelines in Pakistan and Myanmar.
For Beijing, pipelines are less energy supply lines and more economic lifelines. “China’s annual crude oil imports in 2019 increased to an average of 10.1 million barrels per day (b/d), an increase of 0.9 million b/d from the 2018 average. China remains the world’s top crude oil importer…”
The province of Baluchistan has been in continuous rebellion against Pakistan since Pakistan was established on August 14, 1947. Uprising has followed uprising – 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63, 1973-1977, and from 2003 to the present.
New Delhi and Washington should aid Baluch separatists in disrupting operations of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor’s oil pipeline. Extending from Pakistan’s deep-water port of Gwadar to Kashgar in Xinjiang, the pipeline runs through Baluchistan. (Map 38)
Disabling the China Pakistan Economic Corridor pipeline would undercut Beijing’s geopolitical position three way: it would disrupt China’s energy imports; it would disrupt China’s economy, and it would destabilize China’s strategic and volatile western region of Xinjiang. Beijing would be forced to counter the threat posed by Baluch insurgents by redirecting resources from other projects to protect the pipeline and keep it working. It would now be China that would face the possibility of a two-front war – in the Himalaya Mountains and the deserts of Baluchistan. With India able to open one front to confound China on the other front.
New Delhi could weaken Pakistan’s ability to threaten India’s position in Kashmir still further by supporting Pashtun separatists in the north as well as the Baluch insurgents in the south, forcing Islamabad to concentrate on preventing the fragmentation of Pakistan. (Map 39)
Destabilization need not lead to fragmentation. The ramifications of destabilization alone would undermine China’s geopolitical strategy. But if the insurgencies reached a tipping point, the likely political disintegration of Pakistan, Beijing would have to intervene in some manner to preserve its ally’s territorial integrity and its own strategic assets. But any military intervention could have adverse consequences for China similar to the U.S. in Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan.
A Chinese military intervention while rare is not without precedent:
- Tibet, 1950, invasion and annexation,
- Korea,1950-1953, invasion and expulsion of UN forces south of the 38 parallel,
- North Vietnam, 1965-1975, “320,000 troops and annual arms shipments worth $180 million” to defeat S. ally South Vietnam and annex the South to the North,
- Vietnam, 1979, month-long border war to compel Hanoi to withdraw from Cambodia.
And the importance of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor to Beijing cannot be overstated. In addition to securing China’s energy imports from sea lanes, chokepoints, and oil interdiction, the pipeline enables Beijing to control Xinxiang through infra-structure development and Chinese colonization. Possession of Xinjiang, along with Tibet, provides Beijing with natural barriers of mountains, deserts, and plateaus vital to the defense of the exposed river valleys of China proper, the economic powerhouse of the country where more than 90 percent of China’s population resides.  (Map 40)
Because of the open terrain of China proper, Beijing is increasingly apprehen-sive about its weak military position in the defensive barriers of Xinxiang, and Tibet. In January 2021, Beijing’s insecurity over security in Xinjiang and Tibet led to a reorga-nization of the Chinese military in the Western Theatre. But the bulk of China’s ground and air forces still remain concentrated in the east, in China proper, facing South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. (Map 41 and Map 42)
But in a war with India where Beijing is confronting New Delhi on two separate fronts hundreds of miles apart, the Himalaya Mountains and the deserts of Baluchistan, China could see Xinxiang become destabilized if Chinese forces did not win an outright military victory in either theater.
Depending on how Beijing reacted to military stalemate or defeat, destabilization could spread to Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, and even southern China. All are subject to, and resentful of, Beijing’s “Sinicization” policy, which attacks their respective languages, cultures, and traditions. If Beijing were to lose the illusion of military invin-cibility, it could also lose the illusion of national unity. (Map 43)
Map 43 Varieties of Chinese languages, cultures, and traditions
2b. Disrupt China’s energy supply lines from Myanmar.
China’s southern pipelines transport oil and gas from Myanmar’s deep-water port of Kyaukphyu to Kunming in southern China. (Map 44)
In 2019, the pipelines carried nearly 11 million tons of oil and over three million tons of natural gas to feed China’s economy. While Beijing has invested heavily in Myanmar in construction, and mining, it is the economic and strategic value of the pipelines that are most important to Beijing. Daily popular protests against the military’s seizure of power on February 1st has Beijing concerned about the security of its pipelines. According to Reuters, March 11, 2021, “the pipeline has become a target for public anger over perceptions Beijing is backing the junta that seized power in a Feb. 1 coup.”
Documents obtained by VOA (Voice of America),“ reveal China asked Myanmar’s military government late last month [February]to tighten pipeline security during ongoing anti-coup protests… and help with encouraging more positive news media coverage of China…”
Meanwhile, Reuters reports slogans of protesters include “China’s gas pipeline will be burned”. India and the U.S. should support popular discontent against the pipelines. For a variety of reasons, some economic, some political, the pipelines will not be closed, but their operation can be continuously disrupted.
Preventing the Pakistan and Myanmar pipelines from becoming reliable trans-portation conduits of oil and gas keeps China dependent on the maritime routes for nearly all of its petroleum imports. Keeping China dependent on the shipping lanes keeps China’s economy hostage to oil interdiction at the Strait of Malacca. Whether China wins or loses hegemony over Eurasia depends on control of a narrow water way just 580 miles in length.
- Disrupt China’s manufacturing sector.
The manufacturing sector accounts for 30 percent of China’s economic output. Two important industries are clothing and pharmaceutical. Because of questionable practices in both industries, use of slave labor and threats to withhold export of medi-cines to other countries during the Covid-19 pandemic, China has made its economy vulnerable to boycotts by the international community. New Delhi and Washington should lead such boycotts as the issue is one of upholding fundamental human rights.
“China is the largest producer and exporter of clothing, textiles, and apparel in the world.” But it has been accused of employing slave labor.
“Virtually the entire [global] apparels industry is tainted by forced Uighur and Turkic Muslim labour…They include Abercrombie & Fitch, Adidas, Amazon, Calvin Klein, Gap, H&M, Marks & Spencer, Nike, Patagonia, Tommy Hilfiger, Victoria’s Secret, and Zara.”
Because of outsourcing of labor “coerced labor could therefore happen at many points, including during the growing and picking of cotton, the production of thread and fabric, and the manufacturing of the finished item.”
The Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region, representing 190 human rights organizations, along with the AFL-CIO, Human Rights Watch, and Anti-Slavery International, are demanding businesses end their practice of employing slave labor.
Adidas and Lacoste have already “’agree[d] to cease all activity with suppliers and subcontractors’ in Xinjiang after they were implicated in a report published in March  by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.”
Beijing has two options. It can refuse and watch the boycott destabilize its economy and upend its geopolitical ambitions. Or it can agree and watch production costs rise disrupting its economy and undermining its geopolitical ambitions.
Then there is China’s pharmaceutical industry. The world is dependent on it for supplies of many medicines, generic, OTC and patented. The U.S. Department of Commerce “found that 97 percent of all antibiotics in the United States came from China.”
In a ‘trade war” with U.S. President Trump, Xinhua, China’s official state news agency, threatened the lives of Americans, and by implication the lives of people in other countries China views as a rival or a hostile, declaring Beijing “could impose pharmaceutical export controls which would plunge America into ‘the mighty sea of coronavirus.’”
The threat resulted in the introduction of bills in the U.S. Congress to require, or offer incentives to, pharmaceutical companies to “onshore” drug manufacturing.
Since China possesses the world’s second-largest pharmaceutical industry, an industry that is a driving force in its economic growth with a terminal market value in 2018 of $242.9 billion, adoption of any “onshore” bill by the U.S. Congress would adversely impact China’s economy.
Should the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the EU adopt similar legislation, it would destabilize China’s economy and undercut Beijing’s drive for hegemony over Eurasia, and the “World Island”.
China, like the former Soviet Union, seeks global hegemony as its internal documents show. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party studied the collapse of the Soviet Union to insure it does not repeat Moscow’s mistakes. To Beijing, the mistakes Moscow made were not Stalin, the Gulag or the KGB, but to reform, liberalize and democratize.
In its treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, subjecting many to torture, sterilization, and slave labor, in its assault on the autonomy of Hong Kong violating “not only Hong Kong laws but also an international treaty – the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the question of Hong Kong – which promised Hong Kong 50 years of limited autonomy under Chinese rule,” Beijing provides a glimpse into the new world order it wishes to establish.
But China’s geopolitical ambition is dependent upon its economy, which is vulnerable. If it is just the U.S. and India, together they have the means to prevent the coming of this dystopia and insure a once popular Chinese Communist saying comes true – “today’s Soviet Union is tomorrow’s China.”
 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder /chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
 “Royal Geographical Society”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ Royal-Geographical-Society
 Mackinder, H.J., “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, (April 1904), 421-437, https://www.iwp.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/20131016_MackinderTheGeographicalJournal.pdf
 “Halford Mackinder”, Wikipedia, February 19, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halford_Mackinder
 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, “Rethinking Central Eurasia”, Central Asia – Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, Stockholm-Nacka 13130, Sweden, June 2010, p. 94. file:///C:/Users/Joseph/Downloads/ Ismailov_Papava_Rethinking-Central-Eurasia.pdf
 Mackinder, H.J, “Democratic Ideals and Reality”, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996, p. 50 https://web.archive.org/web/20090305174521/http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books /Books%20-%201979%20and%20earlier/Democratic%20Ideals%20and%20Reality%20-%201 942/DIR.pdf
 Mackinder, H.J., “The Geographical Pivot of History”, p. 312, https://www.iwp.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/05/20131016_MackinderTheGeographicalJournal.pdf
 Mackinder, H.J, “Democratic Ideals and Reality”, Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1996, pp. 175-194, https://web.archive.org/web/20090305174521/http://www.ndu.edu/inss /books/Books% 20%201979%20and%20earlier/Democratic%20Ideals%20and%20Reality%20-%201942/DIR.pdf
 Ibid, p. 106, https://web.archive.org/web/20090305174521/http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20%20 1979%20and%20earlier/Democratic%20Ideals%20and%20Reality%20-%201942/DIR.pdf
 “The Sino-Soviet Split”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/20th-century-international-relations-2085155/The-Sino-Soviet-split
 Clayton D. Brown, “China’s Great Leap Forward”, Education About Asia, Volume 17:3 (Winter 2012), https:// www. asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward/
 “Cultural Revolution”, Wikipedia, March 7, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Revolution
 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,“The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives”, Basic Boosk, 1997, p.7, http://www.takeoverworld.info/Grand_Chessboard.pdf
 Stephen Ricafort, “Rimland heartland theory”, Academia.edu, 2021, https://www.academia.edu/ 333997 75/Rimland_heartland_theory
 “Strategic Depth”, Wikipedia, January 8, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_depth#:~:text= Strategic%20depth%20is%20a%20term,of%20population%20or%20military%20production.
 An exception to American exceptionalism (I)”, Oriental Review, 06/09/2014 https://oriental review.org/ 2014/09/06/an-exception-to-exceptionalism-i/
 John Van Oudenaren, “Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: Objectives, Instruments, Results”, RAND Project Air Force, February 1986 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/ 2006/R3310.pdf
 Robert G. Irani, “Changes in Soviet Policy Toward Iran”, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 5, 1980 https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/ u2/a0 87572.pdf
 Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India”, The Journal of Cold War Studies. 12. 50-90, July 2010, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00006
 Kim Donggil, “Stalin’s Korean U-Turn: The USSR’s Evolving Security Strategy and the Origins of the Korean War”, Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 24, no. 1 (June 2011): 89-114, Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Researchgate https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2989576 06_Stalin’s_Korean_U-Turn_ The_USSR’s_Evolving_Security_Strategy_and_the_Origins_of_the_ Korean_War
 “The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1953, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty
 “The East German Uprising, 1955”, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/east-german-uprising
 “Hungary 1956”, United States Department of State Archive, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ lw/107186.htm
 “Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968”, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/soviet-invasion-czechoslavkia
 “Third International”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Third-International
 “Cominform”’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cominform
 “Warsaw Pact”, Wikipedia, January 25, 2021, https://sco.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Pact
 “Russia”, Wikipedia, February 20, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia
 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, “Rethinking Central Eurasia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, Stockholm-Nacka 13130, Sweden, June 2010, p. 90.file:///C:/Users/Joseph/Downloads/Ismailov _Papava_Rethinking-Central-Eurasia.pdf
 Ming-Te Hung and Fanie Herman, “China in Central Asia: Harmonizing Mackinder’s Heartland”, Education about Asia, Volume 18:3 (Winter 2013), Association for Asian Studies, p. 26. https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/china-in-central-asia-harmonizing-mackinders-heartland.pdf
 Ibid, p. 27, https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/china-in-central-asia-harmonizing-mackinders-heartland.pdf
 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,“The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives”, Basic Books, 1997, p.124, http://www.takeoverworld.info/Grand_Chessboard.pdf
 The Great Game”, Wikipedia, February 15, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Game
 Emre İşeri, “The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century, Geopolitics, 14:1, p.43, 2009, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14650040802578658
 “Zbigniew Brzezinski”, Wikipedia, January 31, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zbigniew_Brzezinski
 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,“The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives”, Basic Books, 1997, p.31, http://www.takeoverworld.info/Grand_Chessboard.pdf
 Ibid, p. 32, http://www.takeoverworld.info/Grand_Chessboard.pdf
 “Nicholas John Spykman”’ Wikipedia, February 3, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_J._Spykman
 Stephen Ricafort, “Rimland heartland theory”, Academia.edu, 2021, https://www.academia.edu/33399 775/Rimland_heartland_theory
 Mackinder, H.J, “Democratic Ideals and Reality”, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996,
Introduction, Stephen V. Mladineo, was formerly a Professor of National Security Strategy and Associate Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs at the U.S. National War College at the National Defense University, p. xx https://web.archive.org/web/20090305174521/http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201979%20and %20earlier/Democratic%20Ideals%20and%20Reality%20-%201942/DIR.pdf
 Jeff Janaro, “The Danger of Imperial Overstretch”, Foreign Policy Journal, July 15, 2014, https://www.foreign policyjournal.com/2014/07/15/the-danger-of-imperial-overstretch/
 “China’s Military Strategy (2015)”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015 p.16, English language translation, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/07/China%E2%80%99s-Military-Strategy-2015.pdf
 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
 Sebastien Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, “How Much Money Does the World Owe China,” Harvard Business Review, Feb. 26, 2020. https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-much-money-does-the-world-owe-china
 Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, “Harboured Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific”, C4ADS, Washington DC, 2017, p.19. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950b777a94b55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdfp.
 Charles Dunst, “Opinion: Welcome to China’s new interventionist foreign policy”, The Washington Post, June 2, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/02/welcome-chinas-new-interventionist-foreign-policy/
 Ehsan Masood, “How China is redrawing the map of world science”, Nature, May 1, 2019, https://www. nature.com/immersive/d41586-019-01124-7/index.html
 Maria Smotrytska, “The implementation of the BRI project at sea: South Maritime and Arctic Silk Roads, moderndiplomacy, July 13, 2020. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/13/the-implementation-of-the-bri-project-at-sea-south-maritime-and-arctic-silk-roads/
 Daniel L. Byman and Israa Saber, “Is China Prepared for Terrorism? Xinjiang and Beyond”, Global China, The Brookings Institution, September 2019, p. 6, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ FP_20190930_china_counterterrorism_byman_saber-1.pdf
 Eric Jackson, “Sun Tzu’s 31 Best Pieces Of Leadership Advice”, Forbes, May 23, 2014, https://www. forbes.com/sites/ericjackson/2014/05/23/sun-tzus-33-best-pieces-of-leadership-advice/?sh=5935d9195e5e“”,
 Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger, “Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative, A Report of the Asia Society Policy Institute, September 2020, p. 36 https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Weaponizing%20 the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_0.pdf
 Ibid. p. 42 https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Weaponizing%20the%20Belt%20and%20Road %20Initiative_0.pdf
 “China Paves the Way for a New Silk Road”, Stratfor, May 15, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ china-paves-way-new-silk-road
 Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger, “Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative, A Report of the Asia Society Policy Institute, September 2020, p. 20. https://asiasociety. org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Weaponizing %20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_0.pdf
 Ibid, https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-019-01124-7/index.html
 Ehsan Masood, “How China is redrawing the map of world science”, Nature, May 1, 2019, https://www. nature.com/immersive/d41586-019-01124-7/index.html
 “Kazakhstan suggests laying Power of Siberia 2 gas line to China over its territory”, Caspianbarrel.org, February 2, 2020. http://caspianbarrel.org/en/2020/02/kazakhstan-suggests-laying-power-of-siberia-2-gas-line-to-china-over-its-territory/
 Ananth Krishnan, “5 Myths about China’s One Belt One Road Initiative”, daily-O, 10-05-2017, https://www. dailyo.in/politics/china-one-belt-one-road-silk-road-myths-cpec-obor-pakistan/story/1/17114.html
 “Full text of the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, June 20, 2017, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/ 20/content_281475691873460.htm
 John Lee, “China’s Trojan Ports”, The American Interest, Volume 14, Number 4, November 29, 2018 https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/11/29/chinas-trojan-ports/
 Ibid. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/11/29/chinas-trojan-ports/
 Lexicon, CP. China Policy, January 30, 2017, https://policycn.com/15-12-10-tianxia-%E5%A4%A9%E4% B8%8B-tianxia/
 Daniel Kliman and Abigail Grace, “Power Play: Addressing China’s Belt and Road Strategy”, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), September 20, 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/power-play
 Jonathan E. Hillman, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later”, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), January 25, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years-later-0
 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 121, March 2018, p. 1. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf
 Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, “Harboured Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific”, C4ADS, Washington DC, 2017, p. 20 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950b777a94b55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdfp.
 Ibid., p. 20 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950b777a94b 55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdfp.
 “Three Important oil trade choke points are located around the Arabian Peninsula”, Today in Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, August 4, 2017. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352
 Mordechai Chaziza, “China Consolidates Its Commercial Foothold in Djibouti”, The Diplomat, January 26, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/china-consolidates-its-commercial-foothold-in-djibouti/
 Col Vinayak Bhat (Retd), “Construction fast-tracked at China PLA’s first overseas base in Djibouti”, India Today, October 30, 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/construction-fast-tracked-at-china-pla-s-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti-1736703-2020-10-30
 Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger, “Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative, A Report of the Asia Society Policy Institute, September 2020, p. 12. https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Weaponizing %20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_0.pdf
 Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, “Harboured Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific”, C4ADS, Washington DC, 2017, p.23 https://static1. squarespace.com/static /566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950b777a94b55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdfp.
 Ibid. p. 19. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950 b777a94b 55c3/15239664 89456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdf
 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a choice”, CNBC, March 4, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-data-to-china-government-if-asked-experts.html
 Ibid, p. 5 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950b777a94b55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdfp.
 Ibid, p. 26. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950b777a94b55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdf
 Liehui Wang, Yuanbo Zheng, César Ducruet, Fan Zhang. Investment Strategy of Chinese Terminal Operators along the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”. Sustainability, MDPI, 2019, 11 (7), pp.2066. p. 11 file:///C:/Users/Joseph/Downloads/Investment_Strategy_of_Chinese_Terminal_Operators_.pdf
 Ibid, p. 18 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950 b777a94b 55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdfp.
 Olaf Merk, “China’s participation in European container ports: Drivers and possible future scenarios”, Revue internationale et stratégique Volume 117, Issue 1, 2020, pages 41 to 53. https://www.cairn-int.info/ journal-revue-internationale-et-strategique-2020-1-page-41.htm#
 Emanuele Scimia, “China-operated ports raise security fears for US, NATO”, Asia Times, June 2, 2019, https://asiatimes.com/2019/06/are-chinese-operated-ports-a-security-risk-for-us-nato/
 Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul and Jeremy Scott Diamond, “How China is Buying Its Way into Europe”, Bloomberg, April 23, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-china-business-in-europe/
 Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul and Jeremy Scott Diamond, “How China is Buying Its Way into Europe”, Bloomberg, April 23, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-china-business-in-europe/
 Angela Stanzel, “”Dividing Without Antagonising: China’s 16+1 Image Problem”, China’s investment in influence: the future of 16+1 cooperation, The European Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2014, https://ecfr.eu/publication/chinas_investment_in_influence_the_future_of_161_cooperation7204/
 Axel Berkofsky, China and the EU: “Strategic Partners” No More”, The Institute for Security and Development Policy, Issue & Policy Briefs, December 2019, p.7 https://isdp.eu/publication/china-and-the-eu-strategic-partners-no-more/
 Edward Luttwak, “Theory and Practice of Geo-Economics” from Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy. New York: HarperCollins,.1999, pp.128-129 https://www.dropbox.com/s/bq7618t2tp cm2lq/Theory%20and%20Practice%20of%20Geo-Economics.pdf?dl=0
 “Chinese overseas lending dominated by One Belt One Road strategy”, China Investment Research, June 15, 2015, http://www.chinainvestmentresearch.org/media/chinese-overseas-lending-dominated-by-one-belt-one-road-strategy/
 M. Taylor Fravel. “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion.” International Studies Review, vol. 12, no. 4, 2010, pp. 505-532. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 40931355?read-now=1&seq=10#page_scan_tab_contents
 “An assessment of undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the world, 2012”, U.S. Geological Survey, https://certmapper.cr.usgs.gov/data/apps/world-energy/?resource=conventional
 “China-Russia border”, Wikipedia, January 21, 2021. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93Russia _border
 Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “Dangers Of ,Building Ultra Patriotism As Chinese Claim Vladivostok As Haishenwai”, Russian Briefing, July 8, 2020. https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/dangers-building-ultra-patriotism-chinese-claim-vladivostok-haishenwai.html/
 Ibid. https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/dangers-building-ultra-patriotism-chinese-claim-vladivostok-haishenwai.html/
 Frank Jacobs, “Why China Will Reclaim Siberia”, The New York Times, January 13, 2015. https://www.ny times.com/roomfordebate/2014/07/03/where-do-borders-need-to-be-redrawn/why-china-will-reclaim-siberia
 Andrei Zakharov & Anastasia Napalkova, “Why Chinese farmers have crossed border into Russia’s Far East”’, BBC News, November 1, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50185006
“Based on data released by the state land register, BBC Russian calculated that Chinese citizens either owned or leased at least 350,000 hectares (3,500 sq km) of Far Eastern land in Russia. In 2018, around 2.2 million hectares of Russian land in the region was used for agricultural purposes…The actual proportion could be higher, the BBC has learned.”
 Stephen Blank, “Revising the Border: China’s Inroads into Tajikistan”, China Brief, Volume 11, Issue 14, The Jamestown Foundation, July 29, 2011, https://jamestown.org/program/revising-the-border-chinas-inroads-into-tajikistan/
 Alessandra Colarizi, “China and Kyrgyzstan: So Near, Yet So Far”, The Diplomat, August 11, 2015, https:// thediplomat.com/2015/08/china-and-kyrgyzstan-so-near-yet-so-far/
 Ibid, https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/china-and-kyrgyzstan-so-near-yet-so-far/
 Reuters Staff, “Kazakhstan summons Chinese ambassador in protest over article”, Reuters, April 14, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-china/kazakhstan-summons-chinese-ambassador-in-protest-over-article-idUSKCN21W1AH
 Sidhant Sibal , “Now, Chinese websites claim Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan part of China; draws ire of Central Asia”, WION News, May 11, 2020. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/now-chinese-websites-claim-kyrgyzstan-kazakhstan-part-of-china-draws-ire-of-central-asia-298057
 Paul Goble, “Beijing Implies Tajikistan’s Pamir Region Should Be Returned to China”, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 112, The Jamestown Foundation, July 30, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/beij,, ing-implies-tajikistans-pamir-region-should-be-returned-to-china/
 Till Mostowlansky, “Tajikistan’s Troubled Pamir Region”, The Diplomat, March 1, 2019, https://thediplomat. com/2019/02/tajikistans-troubled-pamir-region/#:~:text=In%20the%20Pamir%20region%2C%20which,civil %20war%20of%201992%2D97.
 Ibid. https://jamestown.org/program/beij,, ing-implies-tajikistans-pamir-region-should-be-returned-to-china/
 Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China-IMF Cooperation Across the Belt and Road”, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), October 18, 2018, p. 12 https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws. com/s3fs-public/181017_DebtTrap.pdf?MKq76lYIBpiOgyPZ9EyK2VUD7on_2rIV
 Dan Kopf and Tripti Lahiri, “The charts that show how Deng Xiaoping unleashed China’s pent-up capitalist energy in 1978”, Quartz , December 17, 2018. https://qz.com/1498654/the-astonishing-impact-of-chinas-1978-reforms-in-charts/
 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective”, Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 121, March 2018, p. 1. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf
 “Nine-dash line”, Wikipedia, February 14, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nine-dash_line
 “Spratly Islands”, Wikipedia, March 6, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands.\
 “Paracel Islands”, Wikipedia, February 12, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands
 Pratas Island”, Wikipedia, January 28, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratas_Island
 “Senkaku”, Wikipedia, March 2, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands
 Caitlin Campbell, Ethan Meick, Kimberly Hsu, and Craig Murray , “China’s “Core Interests” and the East China Sea”, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, May 10, 2013, p. 2. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China’s%20Core%20Interests%20and%20 the%20East%20China%20Sea.pdf
 Scott Neuman and Anthony Kuhn, “Beijing Reportedly Installs Communications Jamming Equipment In South China Sea”, NPR, April 10, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/10/601075294/ beijing-reportedly-installs-communications-jamming-equipment-in-south-china-sea
 Ibid, p.74, file:///C:/Users/Joseph/Downloads/IndoPacificStrategyHudsonInstitute.pdf
 “Pentagon War Games Say The U.S. Will Lose Any War Against China In The Pacific”, The Daily US News, May 16, 2020, https://thedailyusnews.com/pentagon-war-games-say-the-u-s-will-lose-any-war-against-china-in-the-pacific/
 David Lague, “Special Report: China’s navy breaks out to the high seas”, Reuters, November 26, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-navy-specialreport/special-report-chinas-navy-breaks-out-to-the-high-seas-idUSBRE9AQ04220131127
 “Pentagon War Games Say The U.S. Will Lose Any War Against China In The Pacific”, The Daily US News, May 16, 2020 https://thedailyusnews.com/pentagon-war-games-say-the-u-s-will-lose-any-war-against-china-in-the-pacific/
 Rachel Sharpe, “US ‘would lose a war with China fought in the Pacific, is unable to defend Taiwan from an invasion and there are fears the Guam military base is at risk NOW’, Pentagon sources warn”, The Daily Mail, May 16, 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8326109/US-lose-war-China-fought-Pacific-Pentagon-sources-warn.html
 “China’s Strategic Vision, Strengths, and Vulnerabilities: Kevin Rudd’s Address at the West Point Senior Conference”, April 9, 2019, Asia Society https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-strategic-vision-strengths-and-vulnerabilities
 “Internal Chinese report warns Beijing faces Tiananmen-like global backlash over virus”, Reuters, May 4, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-sentiment-ex/exclusive-internal-chinese-report-warns-beijing-faces-tiananmen-like-global-backlash-over-virus-idUSKBN22G19C
 Frank Tang, “China estimates shadow banking worth US$12.9 trillion as it moves to clean up high-risk sector”, South China Morning Post, December 7, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/ article/3112892/china-estimates-shadow-banking-worth-us129-trillion-it-moves
 “Banks, Developers Sink as China Caps Loans to Curb Risk”, Bloomberg News, December 31, 2020, last updated January 5, 2021. https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/china-caps-bank-lending-to-real-estate-to-curb-systematic-risk
 Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, “Defining the Diamond The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” CSIS Briefs, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue
 Max Fisher and Audrey Carlsen, “How China is Challenging American Dominance in Asia”, The New York Times, March 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/09/world/asia/china-us-asia-rivalry.html
 “India vs. China – Demographics”, indexmundi, https://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/india.china/ demographics
 “India vs. China – Economy”, indexmundi, https://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/india.china/economy
 “India vs, China – Geography”, indexmundi, https://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/india.china/geography
 “Military power of India and China”, armeforces.eu, 2019, https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_India_ vs_China
 Dr. Satoru Nagao, “Does the Indian Ocean Matter for U.S.-Japan Relations?”, Strategies for the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions of the U.S. and Like-Minded Countries, Hudson Institute, December 2019, p. 76. file:///C:/Users/ Joseph/Downloads/IndoPacificStrategyHudsonInstitute.pdf
 Ibid. https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/08/26/the-malacca-dilemma-a-hindrance-to-chinese-ambitions-in-the-21st-century/
 Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, “Harboured Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific”, C4ADS, Washington DC, 2017, p. 16. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5ad5e20ef950b777a94b55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdf
 Ibid. https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/08/26/the-malacca-dilemma-a-hindrance-to-chinese-ambitions-in-the-21st-century/
 “The Malacca Dilemma: A hindrance to Chinese Ambitions in the 21st Century”, Berkeley Political Review, August 26, 2019, https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/08/26/the-malacca-dilemma-a-hindrance-to-chinese-ambitions-in-the-21st-century/
 “World War II Island Hopping Primary Resources”, MacArthur Memorial Education Programs, p. 6. https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/1893/Island-Hopping-Primary-Resources
 Zachery Tyson Brown, “Red Star over the Pacific”, Real Clear, May 8, 2019, , https://www.realcleardefense. com/articles/2019/05/08/red_star_over_the_pacific_114408.html
 James Jay Carafano, “Washington poised to become New Delhi’s partner in the Indian Ocean”, GIS/Geopolitical Intelligence Services, November 27, 2017, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/washington-poised-to-become-new-delhis-partner-in-the-indian-ocean,defense,2399.html
 N. Sathiya Moorthy , “String of Pearls: China’s Encirclement of India”, Ceylon Today, November 17, 2020, https://ceylontoday.lk/news/string-of-pearls-china-s-encirclement-of-india
 Sudha Ramachandran “Blood Spilled on China-India Border: Diplomat”, YaleGlobal Online, June 17, 2020. https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/blood-spilled-china-india-border-diplomat
 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “First China, Now Pakistan: How India’s Battling on Two Fronts”, Bloomberg, July 2, 2020 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-02/first-china-now-pakistan-how-india-s-battling-on-two-fronts
 “Indo-Pakistani War of 1971”, Wikipedia, March 11, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_ War_of_1971
 Pratik Jakhar, “India and China race to build along a disputed frontier”, BBC Monitoring, 30 July 2020 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53171124
 Jeff Janaro, “The Danger of Imperial Overstretch”, Foreign Policy Journal, July 15, 2014, https://www. foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/15/the-danger-of-imperial-overstretch/
 “China’s crude oil imports surpassed 10 million barrels a day in 2019”, Today in Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, March 23, 2020, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43216
 “Balochistan”, Wikipedia, March 6, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan
 F.M. Shakil, “Meet the Militants Chasing China Out of Pakistan”, Asia Times, January 21, 2021. https://asia times.com/2021/01/meet-the-militants-chasing-china-out-of-pakistan/
 Daanesh Mustafa and Katherine E. Brown, “Taliban, Public Space, and Terror in Pakistan”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, July 2010, p. 500. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Distribution-of-major-ethnic-groups-in-Pakistan_fig1_240798759
 “List of wars involving the People’s Republic of China”, Wikipedia, February 27, 2021, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/”List_of_wars_involving_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China
 Ibid. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_involving_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China
 “Foreign interventions by China”, Wikipedia, March 6, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_interventions _by_China#cite_note-39
 “Sino-Vietnamese War”, Wikipedia, March 5, 2021 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War
 “Geography of China”, Wikipedia, February 26, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_China# Generalities
 “CPEC to bring peace and prosperity in Xinjiang”, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Portal, August 21, 2020, http://cpecinfo.com/cpec-to-bring-peace-and-prosperity-in-xinjiang/
 “Heihe-Tengchong Line”, Wikipedia, February 23, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heihe%E2%80%93 Tengchong_Line
 “Beijing move a subtle sign of glaring military weak spot”, NZ Herald, February 6, 2021, https://www.nzherald. co.nz/world/beijing-move-a-subtle-sign-of-glaring-military-weak-spot/2YGDOAWCDQ2CV4N2I2S3BECVHA/
 Yogesh Gupta, “The Many infirmities of China’s Western Theatre Command”, The Hindu, January 21, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-many-infirmities-of-chinas-western-theatre-command/article33 621349.ece
 Yael Graner, “Revealed: Massive Chinese Police Data Base”, The Intercept, January 29, 2021, https://the intercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/
 Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang”, CSIS, March 1, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang
 “Varieties of Chinese”, Wikipedia, February 21, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Varieties_of_Chinese#/ media/File:Map_of_sinitic_languages_cropped-en.svg
 “China-Myanmar pipeline carries 10.8 mln tonnes crude oil in 2019”, Xinhua, January 14, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2020-01/14/c_138704469.htm
 “Analysis: ‘Chinese business, Out!’ Myanmar anger threatens investment plans”, Reuters, March 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-china-analysis/analysis-chinese-business-out-myanmar-anger-threatens-investment-plans-idUSKBN2B31C2
 Si Yang, Lin Yang, “Leaked Documents Suggest Fraying of China-Myanmar Ties”, VOA News, March 11, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/leaked-documents-suggest-fraying-china-myanmar-ties
 “Analysis: ‘Chinese business, Out!’ Myanmar anger threatens investment plans”, Reuters, March 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-china-analysis/analysis-chinese-business-out-myanmar-anger-threatens-investment-plans-idUSKBN2B31C2
 Xiangming Chen, “Globalisation redux: can China’s inside-out strategy catalyse economic development and integration across its Asian borderlands and beyond?”, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, March 2018, file:///C:/Users/Joseph/Downloads/SecondproofsChen2-20-2018final.pdf
 Felix Richter, “China is World’s Manufacturing Superpower”, Statista, February 18, 2022, https://www.statista. com/chart/20858/top-10-countries-by-share-of-global-manufacturing-output/
 “Garment Industry Report”, Intrepid sourcing, 2017, https://intrepidsourcing.com/industry-reports/garment-industry-report/
 Julian Kossoff, “’Virtually the entire apparel industry’- from Gap to H&M to Adidas – are profiting from forced Uighur labor, activists say”, Business Insider, July 23, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.in/international /news/virtually-the-entire-apparel-industry-from-gap-to-hm-to-adidas-are-profiting-from-forced-uighur-labor-activists-say/articleshow/77133582.cms
 Elizabeth Paton and Austin Ramzy “Coalition Brings Pressure to End Forced Uighur Labor”, The New York Times, July 23, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/fashion/uighur-forced-labor-cotton-fashion.html
 Yanzhong Huang , “U.S. Dependence on Pharmaceutical Products From China”, Council on Foreign Relations, August 14, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-dependence-pharmaceutical-products-china#:~:text=In%20 the%20discussion%2C%20Gary%20Cohn,United%20States%20came%20from%20China.
 “Growth Insights on China’s Pharmaceutical Industry (2020 to 2025) – Key Market Trends Supporting the Expansion of the Chinese Pharmaceutical Industry – ResearchAndMarkets.com”, Business Wire, February 10, 2020, https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200210005340/en/Growth-Insights-Chinas-Pharmaceutical-Industry-2020-2025
 “China’s pharma market to gain 30% global share”, China Daily, December 20, 2019, http://www.china. org.cn/business/2019-12/20/content_75532721.htm#:~:text=In%20recent%20years%2C%20China’s%20 demand,the%20same%20period%20in%202017.
 Jeremy Page, “China Spins New Lesson From Soviet Union’s Fall”, The Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-spins-new-lesson-from-soviet-union8217s-fall-1386732800
 Emily Feng, “4 Takeaways from Beijing’s Hong Kong Power Grab”, NPR, May 29, 2020
 Carry Huang, “Paranoia from Soviet Union collapse haunts China’s Communist Party, 22 years on”, South China Morning Post, November 18, 2013, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1359350/paranoia-soviet-union-collapse-haunts-chinas-communist-party-22-years