Abstract. This research addresses the survival strategy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, based on a mix of alternatives in its nuclear policy, in relation to the pro-Western state-run coalition led by the United States in Asian region. These alternatives used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are centered on threatening, rewarding promises, and are based on chance assessment as a parameter to optimize the final outcome pursued by this state actor. To model these alternatives, we use a compound game with incomplete information made up of two classic the Chicken game and Prisoner Dilemma game. The optimal nuclear strategy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will be the perfect Bayesian equilibrium point based on odds calculated using Lagrange multipliers and the Cramer method.
Expert Superior Tehnologia Informaţiei la ANAF Braşov. Este dublu licenţiat în Electronică şi Ştiinţe Politice şi deţine un doctorat în Inginerie