By Joseph E. Fallon

Fulfilling a campaign promise¹, on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the United States will withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and begin reinstating economic sanctions on Tehran.²

Numerous legal precedents, spanning several decades, exist for President Trump’s action. In its report, “Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement”, May 4, 2018, the Congressional Research Service noted: “At the turn of the 20th century, however, historical practices began to change, and the fifth form of treaty termination emerged: unilateral termination by the President without approval by the legislative branch. During the Franklin Roosevelt Administration and World War II, unilateral presidential termination increased markedly. Although Congress occasionally enacted legislation authorizing or instructing the President to terminate treaties during the 20th century, unilateral presidential termination eventually became the norm.”³

In 2014, American jurist, Curtis Bradley, William Van Alstyne Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies at Duke University, and co-director for the Center for International and Comparative Law, wrote:  “In 2002, the State Department Legal Adviser’s Office listed twenty-three bilateral treaties and seven multilateral treaties that had been terminated by presidential action since termination of the [1954 Mutual Defense] Taiwan treaty [by President Carter in 1978].⁴,⁵ Since then, the Bush Administration terminated two treaties: a protocol to a consular convention in 2005, and a tax treaty with Sweden in 2007.”⁶

Recent legal precedents for President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear deal are two executive decisions by President George W. Bush. The latter unilaterally withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on December 13, 2001. And six months later, on June 6, 2002, President Bush “unsigned” the United States from the international treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, (the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).⁷

The Iran nuclear deal is officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It “…was signed in July 2015 and went into effect the following January, imposes restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program. The so-called P5+1—that is, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States) and Germany—negotiated the agreement with Iran over nearly two years. During this period, the Obama administration said its intent was to set back Iran’s nuclear program so that if Iran were to sprint toward producing enough fissile material for a weapon—an indicator known as “breakout time”—it would take at least a year, up from just a few weeks.

In exchange for these limitations on Iran’s nuclear program and opening up access to international inspectors, the European Union, United Nations, and United States all committed to lifting sanctions. While the United States has only suspended extant nuclear sanctions, it pledged in the JCPOA to remove specified entities from sanctions lists and seek legislation to repeal the suspended sanctions within eight years, as long as the IAEA concludes that Iran’s nuclear activities remain peaceful in nature.”⁸

Map 1 shows the principal nuclear sites in Iran as of 2015.

Map 1⁹

Chart 1 shows what supporters maintain will happen under the terms of the agreement.

Chart 1¹⁰

President Trump challenged those assumptions. In withdrawing the United States from that agreement, President Trump declared: “The deal lifted crippling economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for very weak limits on the regime’s nuclear activity, and no limits at all on its other malign behavior, including its sinister activities in Syria, Yemen, and other places all around the world.”¹¹

He listed four specific objections to the Iran nuclear agreement.

1. The agreement’s “inspection provisions lack adequate mechanisms to prevent, detect, and punish cheating and don’t even have the unqualified right to inspect many important locations, including military facilities.”¹²

2. The provisions of the agreement allowing Iran to resume its nuclear enrichment program after 2030 are “totally unacceptable”. Trump stated such terms would spark a nuclear arms race in the region, adding “Everyone would want their weapons ready by the time Iran had theirs”. ¹³

(In a March 15, 2018 interview with CBS News, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said: “But without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we would follow suit as soon as possible.”)¹⁴

3. The agreement “fails to address the regime’s development of ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads”¹⁵ (Map 2)

4. The agreement “does nothing to constrain Iran’s destabilizing activities, including its support for terrorism”¹⁶(Map 3)

Map 2¹⁷

Map 3¹⁸

President Trump concluded, however, with an offer to renegotiate the deal with Tehran, which is what he said he would do when campaigning for the U.S. Presidency in 2016.¹⁹

“Iran’s leaders will naturally say that they refuse to negotiate a new deal. They refuse and that is fine. I probably would say the same thing if I was in their position. But the fact is they are going to want to make a new and lasting deal, one that benefits all of Iran and the Iranian people. When they do, I am ready, willing, and able.”²⁰

Two weeks later, May 21, 2018, in a speech before The Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC,²¹ Secretary of State Pompeo listed the issues a renegotiated deal with Iran must address.

“First, Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.

Second, Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy water reactor.

Third, Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.

Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.

Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on spurious charges.

Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of Shia militias.

Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work towards a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.

Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.

Iran, too, must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease harboring senior al-Qaida leaders.

Iran, too, must end the IRG Qods Force’s support for terrorists and militant partners around the world.

And too, Iran must end its threatening behavior against its neighbors – many of whom are U.S. allies. This certainly includes its threats to destroy Israel, and its firing of missiles into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It also includes threats to international shipping and destructive – and destructive cyberattacks.”²²

Secretary Pompeo’s list reflects the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy: “The United States must marshal the will and capabilities to compete and prevent unfavorable shifts in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.”²³

This strategy is a continuation of the official national security strategies proclaimed and pursued by the two previous administrations, George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

The George W. Bush Administration asserted in 2006: the foreign policy objective of the United States government would be to “dissuade any hostile military competitor from challenging the United States, its allies, and partners.”²⁴

Four years later, the Barack Obama Administration released its National Security Strategy, 2010, which affirmed “[t]his Administration has no greater responsibility than the safety and security of the American people. And there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.”²⁵

And “[t]he United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests.”²⁶

President Trump’s opposition to Tehran’s foreign policy reflects a bi-partisan consensus within the U.S. political establishment that has not changed since the 1979 Islamic Revolution overthrew America’s ally, The Shah of Iran, and transformed Iran from ally to adversary. ²⁷

On March 6, 2018, Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, testified before the U.S. Senate on the threat Iran poses to the U.S. and its allies.²⁸ Director Coats stated:

We assess that Iran will continue working to penetrate US and Allied networks for espionage and to position itself for potential future cyber attacks, although its intelligence services primarily focus on Middle Eastern adversaries—especially Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Iran’s ballistic missile programs give it the potential to hold targets at risk across the region, and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Tehran’s desire to deter the United States might drive it to field an ICBM. Progress on Iran’s space program, such as the launch of the Simorgh SLV in July 2017, could shorten a pathway to an ICBM because space launch vehicles use similar technologies.

Iran remains the most prominent state sponsor of terrorism, providing financial aid, advanced weapons and tactics, and direction to militant and terrorist groups across the Middle East and cultivating a network of operatives across the globe as a contingency to enable potential terrorist attacks.

Iran will seek to expand its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where it sees conflicts generally trending in Tehran’s favor, and it will exploit the fight against ISIS to solidify partnerships and translate its battlefield gains into political, security, and economic agreements.

Iran will develop military capabilities that threaten US forces and US allies in the region, and its unsafe and unprofessional interactions will pose a risk to US Navy operations in the Persian Gulf”.²⁹

The policy toward Iran the Trump Administration is pursuing, therefore, goes beyond the issues of the Iran nuclear deal and the Iranian ballistic missile program. It seeks to implement a “roll back”, then a “containment” of Iranian influence in the Middle East.

But it must be remembered the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East was the unintended consequence of policies pursued by the two previous Administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama

Prior to 911, Iran was effectively contained by three, hostile, Sunni powers – Afghanistan under the Taliban to the east, Iraq under Saddam Hussein to the west, and Saudi Arabia to the south.

In response to 911, President Bush launched wars that overthrew the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. This freed Iran from two decades of Sunni encirclement enabling Tehran to expand its influence into Afghanistan³⁰ and Iraq³¹ to a degree previously unthinkable.

Iran expanded its influence in Syria in response to President Obama’s support of Syrian opposition forces seeking to overthrow President Assad, forces that included the terrorist organization al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the name Jaish al Nusra.³² The objective of the U.S. in removing Syrian President Assad from power was to break Iran’s “land bridge” to Lebanon. According to a 2012 report by the Defense Intelligence Agency, “If the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka or Der Zor), and that is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition [the West] want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran).”³³

The policies of the Bush and Obama Administrations are classic examples of “blowback”; defined as “an unforeseen and unwanted effect, result, or set of repercussions.”³⁴ Their policies made Iran more powerful and more influential in the region.

This must be keep in mind by President Trump. For one stated objective of his Iran policy, eliminating Iranian influence from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, could result in a comparable “blowback”. It could prevent the United States from achieving a successful resolution of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Washington risks being perceived as “at war” not with the government of Iran, or terrorist organizations Tehran supports, but “at war” with the Shia religious community. This perception of an anti-Shia bias was given credibility when The New York Times reported on May 21, 2017 that in his speech in Saud Arabia, President Trump “spoke of a stronger alliance with mostly Sunni Muslim nations to fight terrorism and extremist ideology and to push back against Iran.”³⁵

According to Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “We are picking one side in this geopolitical struggle, and there is very little room for gray…Sectarianism is a byproduct of this geopolitical rivalry, and we are inadvertently picking one side in this sectarian struggle.”³⁶

But, since 1979, and with the exception of Iraq since 2003, the United States always has picked the Sunni side in the sectarian struggle”.³⁷ As a rule, out of geopolitical calculations and a belief Shia demonstrations are fomented by Iran, Washington has not supported the democratic rights of the Shia in Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen³⁸, Pakistan or Afghanistan. The United States may condemn human rights abuses of Shia, but will not endanger bilateral relations with Sunni or non-Shia governments by anything stronger, such as sanctions.

Historically, Shia have been oppressed, marginalized, and persecuted by various Sunni governments. According to the BBC, “In countries which have been governed by Sunnis, Shia tend to make up the poorest sections of society. They often see themselves as victims of discrimination and oppression. Sunni extremists frequently denounce Shia as heretics who should be killed.”³⁹

Sunni Saudi Arabia is a case in point. It is a country Washington views as an important ally against Shia Iran. A country described as a “great American ally” in Foreign Policy.⁴⁰ But, “Human Rights Watch has found that the anti-Shia incitement by clerics and government officials, along with anti-Shia bias in the criminal justice system and the Education Ministry’s religion curriculum, is instrumental in enforcing discrimination against Saudi Shia citizens.”⁴¹

Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director, Human Rights Watch noted, “Saudi Arabia has relentlessly promoted a reform narrative in recent years, yet it allows government-affiliated clerics and textbooks to openly demonize religious minorities such as Shia. This hate speech prolongs the systematic discrimination against the Shia minority and – at its worst – is employed by violent groups who attack them.”⁴²

In his 2017 Foreign Policy article, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘War on Terror’ Is Now Targeting Saudi Shiites”, Adam Coogle wrote on how the nexus of Saudi domestic and foreign policies is the Shia. “The hostility and suspicion of the Saudi state, the government-backed Sunni religious establishment, and some elements of the country’s broader Sunni community toward Saudi Shiites reflect more than just long-standing religious intolerance. The contentiousness of regional geopolitics — which Saudi Arabia’s own foreign-policy decisions have contributed to — has also amplified this hostility and suspicion.”⁴³ (Map 4)

Map 4⁴⁴

Saudi Arabia sees itself as the defender of Islam against both “heretical” Iran and the empowerment of Shia in the Middle East. “The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism [Saudi branch of Hanbali school of jurisprudence noted for its ultraconservative tenets],⁴⁵ as both countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam. Saudi Arabia…sponsored militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan who were primarily fighting against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but were also suppressing Shia movements inspired or backed by Iran. The transformation of Iran into an agitator for Shia movements in Muslim countries seemed to confirm centuries of Sunni suspicions that Shia Arabs answer to Persia.”⁴⁶

Although Shias are a religious minority in Islam; estimated at 10% to 13% of Muslims worldwide, ⁴⁷in the Middle East and adjacent South Asia, they number between 140 and 180 million.⁴⁸,⁴⁹ They constitute a majority or significant minority in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, as well as Iran.⁵⁰ This geostrategic arc of countries has been dubbed “The Shia Crescent” (Map 5). It could just as well be called “The Oil Crescent” since Shia reside where most of the oil, the refineries, and the pipelines are located.

Map 5⁵¹

“The Shia Crescent”

The heart of “The Shia Crescent” is Iran, “the global epicenter of Shia Islam.”⁵² It has the largest population in this arc. (81 million in 2018)⁵³ Its population is nearly 95 percent Shia; “the largest concentration of Shia Muslims in the world”⁵⁴. It has one of the largest and most powerful armed forces, not just regionally, but globally. Out of 136 countries reviewed by Global Firepower, Iran was ranked 13^th in military strength.⁵⁵

Iran was reborn as an independent country in 1501. It became Islam’s first official and demographic Shia country.⁵⁶ One success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution was to convince many Shia clerics in countries of “The Shia Crescent” to abandon traditional “quietism” – the belief since the “establishment of an Islamic social order without divine intervention through the return of the infallible Imam is impossible,” he should not be involved in any political activity…”⁵⁷and instead promote “an active involvement of the religious authorities and Shiite masses, when there is a chance of success, against the tyrannies and discrimination of any government.”⁵⁸ This was the “Shia Awakening”

For Washington to adopt a policy to “roll back” Iranian influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, it would have to rely on Saudi Arabia and a Sunni coalition. There is a likelihood forces in a Sunni coalition could go rogue and engage in persecution of local Shia.

This is a real possibility given the words of Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Ambassador to the U.S., head of Saudi Intelligence, to Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, British Secret Intelligence Service prior to 911. “The time is not far off in the Middle East, Richard, when it will be literally ‘God help the Shia’. More than a billion Sunnis have simply had enough of them.”⁵⁹

Opening the door to persecution is the belief among many Sunnis in the Middle East the Shia are not Muslims. In a 2012 analysis, “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity”, the Pew Research Center reported “In five of seven countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa, at least four-in-ten or more Sunnis say Shias are not Muslims.”⁶⁰ Those five countries were Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Territory. The first four are U.S. allies. Egypt and Jordan would likely be part of Washington’s coalition against Iran.

For many Shia in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, (civilians, not terrorist organizations) the expulsion of Iranian influence from their countries would amount to the loss of their only powerful protector. The reaction of many Shia clerics would likely be to urge the Shia masses to resist U.S. policy being executed by Washington’s Sunni allies by any and all means available. This could produce a “blowback” as detrimental to U.S. geopolitical interests as those of Bush and Obama.

The Shia majority in Bahrain could attempt to overthrow Bahrain’s minority Sunni rulers and close U.S. naval bases on the island, which are home to the Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command.

The simmering hostilities in Saudi Arabia’s oil rich Eastern Province between the Shia population and Saudi security forces could reignite into full scale civil war.

The Shia could sabotage oil installations within “The Shia Crescent”, exceeding the precedents set by Saddam Hussein and ISIS, unleashing volatility on the world markets.

As Rasoul Sorkhabi wrote in petroleum science magazine, GEO ExPro: “What makes the Middle East so unique is the concentration of numerous giant fields in the region. With only 2% of the world’s producing wells, the Middle East’s output is over 30% of the world’s crude, highlighting its prolific fields. In addition, the Middle East holds 40% of the world’s conventional gas reserves.” ⁶¹

The region’s importance includes its networks of oil and gas pipelines, (Map 6) and the shipping lanes that pass through the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz. (Map 7)

Map 6⁶²

Oil and Gas Pipelines in “The Shia Crescent”

Map 7⁶³

The Strait of Hormuz

The Shia, Iran or non-state actors, employing “human wave”/suicide attacks reminiscent of Iranian tactics in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)⁶⁴ could sabotage pipelines and attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz sending the world economy into recession, if not depression.

According to Keith Johnson in “Iran’s Hollow Threats to Close the Strait of Hormuz”, Foreign Policy, May 5, 2016, “The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz are crucial not just to regional security, but also to the global economy. Tankers carrying about 17 million barrels of oil a day shimmy through the narrows, accounting for about one-third of all oil traded by sea globally. The strait is also a key conduit for shipments of liquefied natural gas, especially from Qatar. For countries that import oil or gas – including the United States, developed Asian economies, and increasingly, China – keeping Hormuz open to maritime traffic is crucial.” ⁶⁵

The stakes, therefore, are high. The United States must not be drawn into a sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shia. Not by policy, not by appearance, not by mistake. In such a situation, Washington can only lose. It would be helpful when formulating U.S. policy toward Iran to remember the words of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski⁶⁶ and General William Odom; “A successful approach to Iran has to accommodate its security interests and ours.”⁶⁷ Therefore, on the issue of Iran’s influence in Lebanon, Syria⁶⁸, Iraq, and Yemen, given the history of Shia persecution, including more recent attacks on Shia by al-Qaeda⁶⁹ and ISIS⁷⁰ the Trump Administration should consider political, economic, cultural, religious, and under certain conditions, some level of military ties between Tehran⁷¹, and fellow “Shia” governments acceptable. It would be analogous to the ties between Catholic Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary in the Visegrad Group⁷². This would reassure the Shia of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen that the United States is not seeking to undermine the safety of their religious community. In so doing, it would remove a serious obstacle to effectively dealing with Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations. Washington can only succeed in achieving these objectives by addressing Iran as a Middle Eastern state, not a Shia state.