Phd. Jad El Khannoussi
The relations between Iran and its Gulf neighbors were characterized by a markedly conflictive tone, whose most critical point was initiated in the Iranian Revolution (1979). A very recurrent theme throughout history, object of multiple studies by historians, analysts and journalists, the conflict has always been very present and topical, and does not stop projecting its long shadow on the most imminent future. The truth is that we are facing a clash of mentalities and their ways of conceiving civilization. The conflict – or better defined, the clash between the two – is based on Iranian parameters. Therefore, to understand it well it is essential to know the Iranian thought, although it does not exempt the Gulf countries from responsibility.
Las relaciones entre Irán y sus vecinos del Golfo se caracterizan por un tono marcadamente conflictivo, cuyo punto más álgido se inició la Revolución Iraní (1979). Tema muy recurrente a lo largo de la historia, objeto de múltiples estudios por parte de historiadores, analistas y periodistas, el conflicto siempre ha estado muy presente y de máxima actualidad, y no deja de proyectar su alargada sombra sobre el futuro más inminente. Lo cierto es que nos encontramos ante un choque de dos mentalidades y sus maneras de concebir la civilización. El conflicto -o mejor definido, el choque entre ambos- se basa en parámetros iraníes. Por tanto, para entenderlo bien resulta imprescindible conocer el pensamiento iraní, aunque ello no exima de responsabilidad a los países del Golfo.
Within the extensive Islamic world is located the Arab region, a masterpiece in the global geopolitical sphere. Its borders extend from the Atlantic to Iran, and constitute the heart of the world. An area that differs greatly from others, not only because of its enormous natural wealth (67% of the world’s reserves) or because it is the spiritual center of the three monotheistic religions, but also because of its privileged geographical location, a link between three Continents, an advantage that allows the control of the most important maritime passages in the world. From the dawn of time this centre has played a central role in the determination of peoples, and in the rise and fall of the great powers; In other words, the Arab region traced the parameters of the modern world system. Any power that wanted to control the running of the global order must first seize this geostrategic treasure. The clearest example is found in US policy in recent decades. Therefore, all the events taking place there will have consequences for the rest of humanity, especially in the face of increased conflicts, both internal and external, reflecting the chaos in which the post-Cold War global system is existed.
The fall of Iraq had a great influence on the course of events, at least during the last decade. Not in vain, the North American defeat implied to trace again the rules of the geopolitical game in the region, preparing the way for the ascent of new international and regional powers, that acquired an increasingly prominent protagonism. Iran is one of those countries that plays the most role thanks to a series of factors, both internal and external, through which it does not make possible its commitment to seize the region. Some aspirations to occupy spaces in the geopolitical map that come into conflict with other countries, especially those of the Gulf, opening zones of tension that accumulate over time.
Such a dark panorama has caused relations between Iran and its Gulf neighbors to be characterized by a markedly conflictive tone, whose most critical point began in the Iranian Revolution (1979). A very recurrent theme throughout history, object of multiple studies by historians, analysts and journalists, the conflict (or, rather, the disagreement between the two) has always been very present and topical, and continues to project its long shadow over the imminent future. When we speak of international security, it is necessary to refer to the Middle East, because it is the new focus of the global strategic struggle in the current Cold War, as it happened in Europe during the old order. We must not ignore that we are living, for the first time since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), without the preeminence of a single system, or at least of a great power that dictates the rules of international politics, as England did in the past or United States since the fall of the Berlin Wall to its two military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some operations that revealed the limit of its military and economic forces. In this time of absence of aftershocks, any country (whether weak or powerful), armed group (terrorist) or media can influence the evolution of international events. Because it is clear that regional conflicts have acquired a global connotation, especially when we speak of a region of vital importance for all, such as the Arabian Gulf.
Iran and the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have more than one fighting front open over the last five years: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen. The Persian country even managed to penetrate to the Wahhabi heart, taking advantage of its successes in the great game of world geopolitics during the last decade. The climate of conflicts calls into question the context of the region, which since the bombing of Iraq and its subsequent invasion (which led to the fall of the Arab system) has experienced situations that question the most elementary rationality. The truth is that we are facing a clash of two mentalities and their ways of conceiving civilization. On the one hand, we have a very archaic and delayed mentality, that of the Gulf countries, which were unable to put into practice a necessary process of reforms or their total modernization, and remain without institutions, without compasses that can guide their progress towards a future better. They are limited to the protection of attacks from outside. And on the other is the Iranian, egocentric and fundamentalist mentality, which is suspicious of the rest of its neighboring countries and looks at them with obvious contempt.
The cultural isolation suffered by the Persian language and culture, alien to the Arab environment, incites Tehran towards an integrism to be able to overcome it, using its military supremacy and above all the thrust of a complex historical process. A situation that benefits Israel. We speak of two mentalities that are very difficult to make compatible, to the point that it makes it difficult to start any dialogue process.
The conflict – or better defined, the clash between the two – is based on Iranian parameters. Therefore, to understand it well it is essential to know the Iranian thought, although this does not exempt the Gulf countries from responsibility. But it is the Persian nation that has taken the initiative. Iran is the great active force in the Middle East, with a broad energy, demographic strength (75 million) and military strength, in addition to having strategic elements and acting following a well-defined tactics and guided by a firm administration. The opposite happens to the Gulf countries, which only respond to the Tehran initiatives, and never elaborate their own events. Besides, they are divided countries and faced by many problems: with Qatar, the border between Arabia and the Arab Emirates, besides that each one adopts a different attitude towards Iran, and without any precise strategy regarding the complex situation that the region is experiencing. We see it daily in Yemen or Syria, while Iraq, which until recently was acting as a wall against Iranian claims, has become an Iranian sovereignty, because of its serious errors and the tactical approach between Washington and Tehran.
Let us not forget that these Gulf countries were not only a key factor in the final destruction of the Babylonian country, but also to overthrow any democratic Arab process (for example: the first military coup of Algeria and later of Egypt, and its repressions that always they apply to the Arab peoples for fear that the democratic tide will spread to their own countries (as we witnessed in Yemen or Tunisia).
In this article we will try to analyze the parameters and the bases that guide the Iranian politics referred to the Gulf countries, and what are the perspectives of the relations among them. At the same time, we will highlight the course of the relations that both have maintained since 1979 until today, as well as the tactical agreements between Washington and Tehran.
1. A cold peace?
The Iranian Revolution (1979) was a decisive event for the future of the region. He equated it with other very similar international events, which left such a deep impression on the future of the Arab world and on the entire planet. The invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR, the Camp David Accords, the Lebanese civil war …
Precisely, this conflict gave the Persian country a great opportunity and provided a fertile ground to expand their ideals, ie export the revolution, especially in a context of great boom in Islamist demands. Let’s not forget that from the first moment Khomeini institutionalized the Wilaya of the Faqih (Faqih Government), after a fierce struggle against the liberals who tried to copy the French model of the V Republic of De Gaulle (that is, to turn Iran into a Muslim country name and democratic content).
The victory, however, was finally decided for the ayatollahs with the help of the outside, for fear of a possible rapprochement between Iran and the USSR. Let’s not forget that the forces of the left were the ones who led that revolution. The final product was the emergence of a regime unique in the world, which included the theocracy of all its executives in the law of the supreme or high Wali Faqih. According to the article (58) of the Constitution: all executive systems inspire their legitimacy in the Supreme Guide1. Or as the leader Ayatollah Jomaini points out: the imam is the source of all legitimacies until the appearance of the Mahdi2. The Wali Faqih holds the supreme power on the eve of the arrival of the Shia savior, and the presence of supposedly democratic institutions such as the parliament, the holding of elections, etc. In this respect the words of Professor Wajih al-Kawtarani are striking:
“The Wilaya of Fiqh in Iran was transformed into an evocation of a political-religious message that encompasses hatred of the interests of the Islamic State and its geographical, economic and geostrategic interests.”3
Since then, the Persian country has not stopped trying to expand its doctrine to neighboring countries, especially the Gulf States. A process based on the Iranian Constitution: for example articles 152 and 154, which encourage support for those who qualify as weak (in reality, it is only a facade behind which Tehran is hidden4). Iranian politics remains closely linked to its identity as a State, turning its back on principles such as good neighborliness and non-intervention in internal affairs of other countries that decree the principles of International Law. In this continuous effort to destabilize its neighbors – as Hachimi Rafsamjan declared at the time – if it is necessary to resort to force in its aspirations, Iran crosses borders. Furthermore, according to the Iranian sociologist Ali Shari’ati, he never renounces the divine right of the Persian kings and the arrival of the supposed Al-Mehdi to rule the entire Islamic world5. Even the Iranian Constitution itself did not get rid of this budget, its article 107 states: “in the absence of the Mahdi, the leadership of the nation falls on the responsibility of the Republic of Iran6.” This guideline therefore constitutes – as Professor Ahmed al-Kateb affirms – one of the basic pillars of its foreign policy, from the time of the Shahes to the Ayatollahs7. Precisely, it was one of the main arguments that prompted the countries of the region to create the Gulf Cooperation Council (1981), to try to stop Iranian aspirations. The first attempts were made in practice in Iraq, a key factor in the Iranian strategy.
The Babylonian country represents the gateway to the Arab world. Its privileged geographical location, a bridge between the Arab Gulf and Iran, allows the Persian country to reach vital areas. Any domain exercised over this territory would be to take the first step to control Lebanon and Syria, and from there expand throughout the Gulf. A situation very similar to the one we witness today. In addition, Iraq hosts a very diversified social structure, in which the Shia is an important element within its varied ethnic mosaic. He quickly mobilized the religious authorities of Neyaf to demonstrate, in order to overthrow the Saddam regime. At the same time, he took advantage of the Lebanese civil conflict, where the Shiites were a weak political and military minority to create Hezbollah and to be his armed wing. The new experience was tried to expand to the rest of the Arab countries, but failed, especially after losing its war against Iraq (1980-1988).
After the end of that First Gulf War and the death of Khomeini, a new era began that many described as golden in terms of the rapprochement between the two, when the Persian country – as Garry Sick points out – changed its policy and tried to be an example attractive for the rest of Muslim countries8. From the beginning, the principles of the Iranian Revolution (using a war metaphor) had retreated to their winter quarters9. Thus began a new pragmatic era, based on strategic and economic interests, which led the Persian country to try to adapt to the reality of that time, marked at the regional and international level by the bombing of Iraq. Tehran was very critical of the Iraqi invasion in order to free itself from its isolation and the dismemberment of the USSR. In addition to suffering a serious internal crisis that caused a strong division in the Iranian society, and that – as Anoushiravan Ehteshami highlights – makes the population contemplate the events in a different way to the years before the war against Iraq10. This new Iranian pragmatism, led by reformists, tried at least to make up the nature of the political system and open up to the outside, especially to its Gulf neighbors and above all to Saudi Arabia. However, a series of events belie this supposed opening: the rejection of the radical sector to the request of King Fahd’s visit from Arabia to Iran in 1992, the refusal of Tehran to accept the planned negotiations in the Iranian capital (1993) around to the three islands occupied by Iran that belong to the Arab Emirates, in addition to their inability to show any document that ratifies their right over them. Let us not forget that the Persian country carried out the occupation after the English withdrawal from the region in 1971 and received the approval of the United States, which vetoed the decision of the UN Security Council, and since then the maximum organism has postponed the meeting on the matter until today. The new situation supposed to return to a new climate of doubts and uncertainties between both sides. We must not neglect that Iran occupies about 120,000 Arab kilometers, in addition to the Ahwaz region rich in natural resources, and three islands (Abu Musa, Tunb Grande and Minor), of vital strategic importance that cross the Arabian Gulf in the direction of Canal de Hormuz, where 80% of the energy transports from the Gulf countries circulate daily.
The Government of Jattami (1996) put into practice new principles, marked by the dialogue between civilizations and the opening of external relations, especially with neighboring countries. The new president was aware of the serious economic crisis that Iran was going through, but the dominance of the radical sector, led by the supreme leader of the revolution Ali Jamenaí, made it impossible to consolidate these approaches between both sides of the Strait of Hormuz. The situation worsened still further with the arrival of Mahmud Nayyad in power in 2005. Again, dogmatic intransigence again took hold of Iranian foreign policy. Since then, tensions between Iran and its neighbors have not stopped growing, as we witnessed in numerous regional conflicts (Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, etc.). The invasion of Iraq (2003) and its subsequent agreement with the Americans facilitated the way to undertake its new strategy on the region, outlined in the protocol “The vision of Iran 2025”.
2. A hegemonic strategy
The Strategic Document 2005-2025 published by Ali Jamenai (4-11-2003) is one of the most important writings of Iranian politics. It was drafted as a kind of road map, to detail the role of Iran in the Gulf countries environment during that period. Iran’s overarching vision is based on two objectives: first, to be an influential power in the Middle East and to play a leading role in most international affairs. Professor Ali Hassan Baker highlights it:
“The Iranian document came to confirm the strategic process that covers the period 2002-2025, after another document (Um al-Qura). It is a project that includes the visions of the future role of Iran in the region for the next two decades. According to its parameters, Tehran is on the verge of becoming the central and hegemonic axis of the region, and therefore becoming an influential global power, both regionally and globally.”11
To make it effective, the Iranian administration focused its strategic and military project on reaching a hegemonic position in the Arabian Gulf. In addition, to strengthen its military forces in order to face any aggression coming from abroad, aspiring to cover all its strategic, tactical and military needs. Precisely, from this plan arises the Iranian insistence to have nuclear technology. In Tehran, it is highly valued to learn from the experience of North Korea, whose nuclear force was sufficient to avoid any military aggression, in the event that there was a confrontation with the West or another great power.
Since then (that is, after the US invasion of Iraq), the Persian country was the great beneficiary of the geostrategic game that emerged from the marriage between Washington and Tehran. Iran exerts an effective combination of soft power and hard power. During the last years the characteristic has been to resort to the first, since the Iranian mentality usually avoids the direct confrontation with any country, which shows the experience that has been accumulating after its defeat against Iraq in the First Gulf War. Today, any resolution of the conflicts in the Arab region is virtually impossible without the presence of the Persian country. The situation would be unsustainable if it were not for Iranian diplomacy and its open-door policy, but without ever renouncing its principles, on which the foreign policy of this Central Asian country is based. Since then, defeated his two enemies (the regime of Saddam and the Taliban in Afghanistan), the Persian country has not stopped acquiring prominence at regional level, especially after the commitment maintained with the United States and that culminated in the Nuclear Agreement ( 14-7-2015).
3. A secret cohabitation?
There is no issue that arouses greater confusion among researchers and analysts than the relationship between Washington and Tehran, especially in the post-Iranian era. If we attend to the mutual accusations, we can appreciate the hatred that they profess towards each other, to the point that many times a possible American bombing of Iran was feared (in fact, the opposite happened). From the first moment of that revolution (in which the protagonism of the Americans was fundamental for its triumph, according to Reynold Dreyfuss), and then followed by the farce of hostage-taking (a crude comedy starring American spies), the arrival at the White House of Ronald Reagan will be the decisive event, added to the agreement with Israel to destroy the Iraqi nuclear program or the sale of arms to the Iranian Contra (1986). The relations between both countries was no more than a succession of lies widely disseminated by the media, and that the geopolitical reality shows daily. This secret marriage (at least, it was foreseen), was consecrated after the attacks of September 11, when both saw the need to collaborate in the so-called “Declared War on Terror”. The Persian country was a decisive element in the struggle, as well as in the “constructive chaos” that so often evoked the Bush Administration, which on the one hand favored instability in the Arab region, and on the other accelerated the return of Russia and China to the international sphere.
The leaders of both countries, pushed by the new geopolitical situation, have tried to approach, although the Persian country was presented as the great enemy that threatens the security of Israel and the entire region, and even Washington included it in the called “Axis of Evil” (in addition to Iraq and North Korea). In fact, this accusation helped Iran to become increasingly involved in Arab affairs. And therefore, to use the Palestinian question as a kind of Trojan Horse, as Iranian professor Trita Parsi warns:
“It was impossible to attract the Arab peoples behind Iran, in order to achieve their hegemonic objectives. For that reason, he resorted to ideology to hide his expansionist pretensions, taking advantage of the suffering of the Palestinian people. “12
The Persian country turned out to be a decisive factor in the defeat of the Taliban, since we should not forget that the logistics center of the US operations against Afghanistan was located in the Iranian city of Mahabad. In the same way, it was of vital importance in the capitulation of the Iraqi army. This is highlighted by the Iranian leaders themselves, in the case of Vice President Mohamed Ali Abatí: “Without Iranian aid, the fall of Kabul and Baghdad with this facility would have been difficult”13. Paul Bremer himself in his Memoirs recognizes the alliance with the Shia14. After the loss of Baghdad and the US shipwreck, Washington decided to surrender the country to the ayatollahs, which is known as the Great Agreement or Tactical Agreement, and after the contacts maintained there was a permanent delegation of relations during the entire period of the government of Bush. The same directive was maintained by the Obama Administration, which made the serious mistake of destroying the Sunni component in Iraq. At the same time, the US government remained silent in the face of the brutality of the Iranian regime against its people (2009) and the 6 billion dollars that the Persian country took away from Baghdad (and that continues to this day). In addition, while signing a grand pact for the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia (2013) he secretly met with the Iranian leaders in the Sultanate of Oman. These dark maneuvers are not strange in the back room of politics, the alliances of the Persian country with external power goes back to very ancient times. Take, for example, the Grand Alliance between Ismail al-Safawi and the Portuguese King Manuel II to destroy the Holy Places of Medina (1501). Or the role played by the Afsarid and Kayar dynasty in the weakening of the Ottoman Empire: every time the Ottomans besieged Europe, both lineages assaulted them in the rear, and after decades of confrontations ended up sunk, to the point of becoming easy prey of European aggressions.
Nothing is stable in the relations between these two countries, especially mediating a person as pragmatic as Donald Trump, who never ceases to pressure Tehran to annul the 5 + 1 Nuclear Agreement. In fact, the objective is to alienate the Persians from China (the same can be said of Russia in its attempt to reach the Arabian Gulf), with the aim of preventing a new silk route (a project linking 65 countries) that arrives to the Mediterranean Iran is not only a central country in the strategy of the Asian giant (do not forget that China is well settled in the African Horn with a military base in Djibouti). The Chinese initiative represents the realization of an old Iranian dream (the project of President Akbar Rafsanjani in the eighties of the last century). Iran has already signed agreements with Beijin (17 in particular and 40 billion dollars), the main reason for the new sanctions applied to the Persian country by Washington, because the project, if it culminated, would put an end to the North American leadership. in the Arab region as on a world scale. Therefore, Iran is expected to play its role in the region under Washington’s dependence, including the aspiration to accelerate the rapprochement between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Not forgetting the Russian attempt to build a canal between the Caspian Sea and the hot waters (Russian dream that goes back to the times of the Tsars) and that would allow the Kremlin to reach the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, a project that has already he tried in his day with the government of Ahmadi Nayyad. All these aspirations of the great powers will further strengthen the geostrategic content that the Persian country possesses, which will become an inevitable meeting point. In this sense, it is not strange to contemplate the fierce confrontation between the different groups of power, positioning themselves in favor or against one power or another. The real Iranian objective – as they have always aspired – is to play a leading role in an increasingly changing world order, despite being a country in transit, which never concealed its aspirations to become a great regional power with its own policies and interests.
4. The Iranian dogma around the Arabian Gulf
The Iranian foreign policy linked to the Arab Gulf countries is composed of several elements and the role they play. Several are therefore the points that constitute the central nerve of its policy, both in its military and diplomatic aspects. Any process of analysis of Iran, referring both to its strategy with the countries of the Arab region and the rest of the globe, needs inexcusably to cover the following points:
1- The main driving force behind Iranian politics is its dogmatic and doctrinal impetus, which far surpasses all others. The Kuwaiti professor Abdulah al-Nufaisi, a pioneer in studying Shia political thought, explains this:
“It is difficult to understand Iran, without knowing Shiism and everything that surrounds it, not only as a dogma of Fiqh but also as a political dogma. Anyone who studies the history of Shi’ism in terms of a political group that lived with a historical injustice for about a thousand years, is likely to better understand the ideological thrusts of Shiite political behavior. “15
In Tehran, preeminence is given to the dogmatic component and the rest remains their service. The Iranian vision is based on the principles of its Islamic revolution, and closes its eyes when it clashes with its interests. For example, his support for Christian Armenia against Muslim Azerbaijan (which has no relation to Islam), because – according to Iranian dogmatism – what the world needs today is Iranian Islam, hence its insistence on spreading it to other countries. Related to this purpose, the main work of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is the propaganda of the Shia dogma; In other words, export the revolution to the rest of the world with special attention to the Arab countries. The historical views of the Islamic dogma are its foundation, which never evolves. It is therefore fundamental to know the principles of this doctrine in order to know the vision that the Iranian mentality has of the other, and therefore to know what happens inside and outside of Iran.
2- The psychological formation of the iranian citizen. The peroples are differentiated by their characters and traditions. From this budget, and on a scientific and reasonable basis, we can affirm that the iranian mentality is quite complex. Iran is a country that takes advantages of the sentiment of the Shia citzen, bot Persien and Arab, and his loyally to the wali faqih. These citizen’s constitute a very important percentage in the social structure of the Gulf (20% in Saudi Arabia, 30% in Kuwait, and more the 50% in Bahrain of Iraq). Iran is in constant contact with the Arabs and destroy countries from with in (for example, the attaks in Bagdad or Kuwait). Not only that, the iranian dogmatism also tries to in doctrinate the students who come to the city of Qum or to feed its doctrine rhrough cultural expeditions in various African and Asian countries, as can be seen in the following Magazine Times report:
“Certainly, the Iranian government sends money and cultural expeditions to countries like Nigeria, Guinea and takes advantage of Muslim students from Thailand, Syria or Indonesia who study in Qum.”16
Let us not forget that on the eve of the invasion of Iraq by the United States, Tehran put pressure on the Shiite ulema to issue sentences prohibiting all kinds of struggle against the Americans. Even Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld recognized this in his Memoirs.
3- The historical roots. There is no doubt that the cultural heritage of the Persian people is very present in the region. We should not forget this matter. Iran is the historical neighbor of the Arab countries and has lived with them in different stages of its history, without forgetting the geographical and demographic flow that they have exchanged. In this aspect, the Iranian rise usually happens in times of Arab decline. A similar situation occurs with Turkey and the West.
4- The struggle between Iran and Arabia to represent Islam is possibly the great Iranian desire. The Persian country considers its Shia Islam as the true one, to which all Muslims aspire, while Saudi Wahhabism is fanatical, a religion of treacherous princes and sheiks at the service of outside forces. Therefore, for the Arab peoples it is a duty to rebel against the Wahhabists and stay under the orbit of the ayatollahs, a position that destabilized the structure of Arab societies. To combat it, Iran proposes a very demanding budget for the spread of Shiism and at the same time support their militias spread across various countries.
5- Iran considers the Gulf countries as a colonial instrument at the service of its interests. This assumption is very clear in the pre-Iranian era, when the West supported the Shah to the detriment of the Iranian people.
6- The incitement of Israel and the Western response. The Israeli pressure groups compress the Arab region to a point of maximum congestion, seeking their own destiny and benefit. It is the strategy of double contention. Israel always tries to show the world that Iran is the greatest threat to world peace, even if at bottom it is nothing more than a subtle maneuver. The words spoken by Issac Rabin are still valid: “Iran is our favorite friend and we are not going to change this opinion”17. Therefore, there will never be stability in the Arab region without the necessary siege on Iran. In addition, Iran threatens the interests of other powers. If Zionism does not succeed in their claims, they may turn against them, and then they would be left alone at the mercy of a hostile environment.
7.The privileged geographical situation of Iran, with exit to the Hormuz Canal, makes it a bridge of international trade, especially oil, and makes the Persian country a customer of the calculations of the great powers, it means having the key to all Central Asia. Iran is situated in the eastern part of the Arabian Gulf. A strategic location that made him control the maritime and land passes that extend from Asia Pacific to Europe and China, including the countries of the Middle East. In addition, its presence with the Gulf countries further complicates the situation, due to the importance of the Arab region for the entire planet. And the Gulf region will acquire a prominent role in the future when we talk about renewable energy.
8. Mecca and Medina, two cities that are the spiritual center of the Muslims and a possible base to achieve their unification tomorrow. Iran tried to find other symbolic cities (for example, Qom or Najaf) but without success, despite the annual pilgrimage of thousands of faithful to Karbale to commemorate the feast of Achurae. Iran is aware that control of these cities would allow the fidelity of more than 1.9 billion Muslims, so try to overthrow the spiritual leadership of Arabia based on the presence of these two sanctuaries and seize the heart of dogma . To achieve this, he adopts the strategy of Um al-Qura that was drawn by Professor Ali Lariyani, one of the great physicists and mathematicians of Iran. The great countries base their strategies on philosophies and theories, according to previously drawn parameters. Lariyani’s theory projects that Iran will become the spiritual and political center of the Islamic world in the medium term (50 years). To make it a reality, the Persian country will have to work using all the necessary means: presence in Arab States through charities, schools (at this point, Iran paid for the land in a large part of the Arab countries, not only in the Gulf countries) , or coercive measures resorting to militias (Hezbollah, Hutties).
Iran has been trying for decades to realize its anxious expansionist process – the Shiite Arc – taking advantage of the bubble situation that the region is going through. Their constant aggressions against the Arab peoples and the ethnic cleansing that is being applied in Syria, or before in Iraq among other countries in the region, would be a faithful reflection. They no longer convince their disguises of false rallies that even the ayatollahs do not believe, because the Persian country has lost all protagonism in the conscience of the Arab peoples and it will be very difficult to deceive them again. From now on the Persian country will have to face the wrath of the people, and history shows that this kind of battles always ends up losing the aggressor, especially if we speak of a weak nation, formed by a mosaic of ethnic groups, without forgetting the growing social discontent he suffers. The same situation goes through the Arab regimes, lacking any legitimacy, and they only resort to the external dimension when they need protection (at least, that’s what they presume). Because the United States and Israel will never go to a war because of the Arabs. The permanent attitude of relying on the United States is a source of conflict. More productive would be to try to reconcile the peoples. Therefore, the two opposing sides are the only ones defeated in this interminable situation. And the final costs will be paid by the Arab population of the Gulf. But the region also has possibilities of changing the situation. The instability that Iran sow can be reversed by fostering cooperation processes. For example, a kind of Commonwealt could be organized, including Turkey, since the awakening of the region is inexcusably due to the agreement and collaboration between these three actors (Arabs, Iranians and Turks). Or create a geopolitical group that extends from the Atlantic to Central Asia, where Tehran and Ankara play the role of the elder brother. Thus, the trillions of Arab dollars that escape to foreign banks could be used for the benefit of native societies. A project that if it were to become effective would change the course of history. The Persian country constitutes a geographical and historical entity in the region, it is neither a colonizer nor an occupier, a reality that the Arab leaders should not continue to deny. In the same way, Tehran must know that its constant interventions in the Arab territories will not lead to any port. Quite the contrary, the only thing it does is generate a hostile climate that they will have to pay at a very high price. Meanwhile, the big winners are the great powers and Israel, who take advantage of the endless conflicts to sell arms, guarantee their energy and strategic interests and, above all, remove tensions with their discriminatory policy on the Palestinians. In the medium term the conflict will remain in force until they find a feasible way to understanding and dialogue. The truth is that it will only be achieved through a democracy, and not with tyrannical governments that pay no attention to the nation or the people. The creation of modern states and the primacy of law and respect for the human being is the most effective way to avoid tensions and conflicts. The truth is that today it is very complicated to have wars, due to the complexity of the modern global system. The autocracies, both religious and ideological that still shake the world, have no future, and the best example is found in the extinct USSR.
- Extraed desde internet: htpp://www.as.mfa.is/index.aspex?teyd.s3/ted-2sapajed=142.
AL-JOMAINI, R.: Al-Hokuma al-islamiya [El Gobierno islámico]. Beirut: Dar al-Ilmiya, 1979, p. 140.
AL-KAWTARANI, W.: Bayna Wilayate al-Faqih wa Fiqh al-islah al-Chiie [Entre la Wilaya del Faqih y el Fiqh del reformismo chií]. Beirut: Dar al-Nahal, 2007, pp. 121-122.
Cfr. SHARI’ATI, A.: Al-Tacha’yue al-Safawi wa Al-Tacha’yue al-Alawi [El cheísmo Safawi y el cheísmo alauita]. Beirut: Dar al-Amir, 2007, p. 139.
Cfr. AL-KATEB, A.: Tatawor al-Fikr al-siyassi al-Chiie [La evolución del pensamiento político chií]. Beirut: Dar al-Yadida, 1998, p. 375.
Cfr. “Interview with Garry Sick”. New York, 25/2/2004
Vid. The Gulf challenge of the futures. Emirates: center for strategie and Resherch, 2002, pp. 163-183.
EHTESHAMI, A.: After Khomeini. London: Routdelge, 1995, p. 140.
BAKER, A. H.: Al-Ab’ad al-geoestratigia le siyasa al-Iranía wa Turquía hayal Suria [Las dimensiones geoestratégicas de la política iraní y turca en torno a Siria]. Doha: Centre Arab de Studie, 2013.
TRITA, P.: Treacherous Alliance. Yale: University press, 2007, p. 10.
Charq Al-Awsat, 9/2/2002.
Vid. BREMER, P.: My year in Iraq: the struggle to build a future of hope. Hardcover, 2005.
AL-NUFFAISI, A.: Irán Wa Al-Jalige: Tuna’iyate al-bo’ad Wa al-Taqarub [Iran and the Gulf countries: The Dialectic of approach and withdrawal]. Kuwait: Dar Qartas, 1999, p. 5
Magazine Times, 4/11/1991.
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– AL-JOMAINI, R.: Al-Hokuma al-islamiya [El Gobierno islámico]. Beirut: Dar al-Ilmiya, 1979.
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